System and method employing an agile network protocol for secure communications using secure domain names

ABSTRACT

A client device comprises: (a) a memory, (b) an application program, and (c) a signal processing configuration. The memory is configured and arranged to facilitate a connection of the client device with a target device over a secure communication link created based on (i) an address request generated by the client device, and (ii) a determination as a result of the address request that the target device is a device with which a secure communication link can be established when the requested address is identified in an address lookup. The application program is configured and arranged so as to allow participation in audio/video communications with the target device over the secure communication link once the secure communication link is established. The signal processing configuration is arranged to execute the application program.

CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS

This application claims priority from U.S. application Ser. No.13/903,788, filed May 28, 2013, which claims priority from and is acontinuation of co-pending U.S. application Ser. No. 13/336,790, filedDec. 23, 2011, now U.S. Pat. No. 8,458,341, which claims priority fromand is a continuation of co-pending U.S. application Ser. No.13/049,552, filed Mar. 16, 2011, which is a continuation of U.S.application Ser. No. 11/840,560, filed Aug. 17, 2007, now U.S. Pat. No.7,921,211, which is a continuation of U.S. application Ser. No.10/714,849, filed Nov. 18, 2003, now U.S. Pat. No. 7,418,504, which is acontinuation of U.S. application Ser. No. 09/558,210, filed Apr. 26,2000, now abandoned, which is a continuation-in-part of U.S. applicationSer. No. 09/504,783, filed on Feb. 15, 2000, now U.S. Pat. No.6,502,135, issued Dec. 31, 2002, which claims priority from and is acontinuation-in-part patent application of previously-filed U.S.application Ser. No. 09/429,643, filed on Oct. 29, 1999, now U.S. Pat.No. 7,010,604, issued Mar. 7, 2006. The subject matter of U.S.application Ser. No. 09/429,643, which is bodily incorporated herein,derives from provisional U.S. application Ser. Nos. 60/106,261 (filedOct. 30, 1998) and 60/137,704 (filed Jun. 7, 1999). The presentapplication is also related to U.S. application Ser. No. 09/558,209,filed Apr. 26, 2000, now abandoned, and which is incorporated byreference herein. Each of the above-mentioned applications isincorporated herein by reference in its entirety as though fully setforth herein.

BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION

A tremendous variety of methods have been proposed and implemented toprovide security and anonymity for communications over the Internet. Thevariety stems, in part, from the different needs of different Internetusers. A basic heuristic framework to aid in discussing these differentsecurity techniques is illustrated in FIG. 1. Two terminals, anoriginating terminal 100 and a destination terminal 110 are incommunication over the Internet. It is desired for the communications tobe secure, that is, immune to eavesdropping. For example, terminal 100may transmit secret information to terminal 110 over the Internet 107.Also, it may be desired to prevent an eavesdropper from discovering thatterminal 100 is in communication with terminal 110. For example, ifterminal 100 is a user and terminal 110 hosts a web site, terminal 100'suser may not want anyone in the intervening networks to know what websites he is “visiting.” Anonymity would thus be an issue, for example,for companies that want to keep their market research interests privateand thus would prefer to prevent outsiders from knowing which websitesor other Internet resources they are “visiting.” These two securityissues may be called data security and anonymity, respectively.

Data security is usually tackled using some form of data encryption. Anencryption key 48 is known at both the originating and terminatingterminals 100 and 110. The keys may be private and public at theoriginating and destination terminals 100 and 110, respectively or theymay be symmetrical keys (the same key is used by both parties to encryptand decrypt). Many encryption methods are known and usable in thiscontext.

To hide traffic from a local administrator or ISP, a user can employ alocal proxy server in communicating over an encrypted channel with anoutside proxy such that the local administrator or ISP only sees theencrypted traffic. Proxy servers prevent destination servers fromdetermining the identities of the originating clients. This systememploys an intermediate server interposed between client and destinationserver. The destination server sees only the Internet Protocol (IP)address of the proxy server and not the originating client. The targetserver only sees the address of the outside proxy. This scheme relies ona trusted outside proxy server. Also, proxy schemes are vulnerable totraffic analysis methods of determining identities of transmitters andreceivers. Another important limitation of proxy servers is that theserver knows the identities of both calling and called parties. In manyinstances, an originating terminal, such as terminal A, would prefer tokeep its identity concealed from the proxy, for example, if the proxyserver is provided by an Internet service provider (ISP).

To defeat traffic analysis, a scheme called Chaum's mixes employs aproxy server that transmits and receives fixed length messages,including dummy messages. Multiple originating terminals are connectedthrough a mix (a server) to multiple target servers. It is difficult totell which of the originating terminals are communicating to which ofthe connected target servers, and the dummy messages confuseeavesdroppers' efforts to detect communicating pairs by analyzingtraffic. A drawback is that there is a risk that the mix server could becompromised. One way to deal with this risk is to spread the trust amongmultiple mixes. If one mix is compromised, the identities of theoriginating and target terminals may remain concealed. This strategyrequires a number of alternative mixes so that the intermediate serversinterposed between the originating and target terminals are notdeterminable except by compromising more than one mix. The strategywraps the message with multiple layers of encrypted addresses. The firstmix in a sequence can decrypt only the outer layer of the message toreveal the next destination mix in sequence. The second mix can decryptthe message to reveal the next mix and so on. The target server receivesthe message and, optionally, a multi-layer encrypted payload containingreturn information to send data back in the same fashion. The only wayto defeat such a mix scheme is to collude among mixes. If the packetsare all fixed-length and intermixed with dummy packets, there is no wayto do any kind of traffic analysis.

Still another anonymity technique, called ‘crowds,’ protects theidentity of the originating terminal from the intermediate proxies byproviding that originating terminals belong to groups of proxies calledcrowds. The crowd proxies are interposed between originating and targetterminals. Each proxy through which the message is sent is randomlychosen by an upstream proxy. Each intermediate proxy can send themessage either to another randomly chosen proxy in the “crowd” or to thedestination. Thus, even crowd members cannot determine if a precedingproxy is the originator of the message or if it was simply passed fromanother proxy.

ZKS (Zero-Knowledge Systems) Anonymous IP Protocol allows users toselect up to any of five different pseudonyms, while desktop softwareencrypts outgoing traffic and wraps it in User Datagram Protocol (UDP)packets. The first server in a 2+-hop system gets the UDP packets,strips off one layer of encryption to add another, then sends thetraffic to the next server, which strips off yet another layer ofencryption and adds a new one. The user is permitted to control thenumber of hops. At the final server, traffic is decrypted with anuntraceable IP address. The technique is called onion-routing. Thismethod can be defeated using traffic analysis. For a simple example,bursts of packets from a user during low-duty periods can reveal theidentities of sender and receiver.

Firewalls attempt to protect LANs from unauthorized access and hostileexploitation or damage to computers connected to the LAN. Firewallsprovide a server through which all access to the LAN must pass.Firewalls are centralized systems that require administrative overheadto maintain. They can be compromised by virtual-machine applications(“applets”). They instill a false sense of security that leads tosecurity breaches for example by users sending sensitive information toservers outside the firewall or encouraging use of modems to sidestepthe firewall security. Firewalls are not useful for distributed systemssuch as business travelers, extranets, small teams, etc.

SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION

A secure mechanism for communicating over the internet, including aprotocol referred to as the Tunneled Agile Routing Protocol (TARP), usesa unique two-layer encryption format and special TARP routers. TARProuters are similar in function to regular IP routers. Each TARP routerhas one or more IP addresses and uses normal IP protocol to send IPpacket messages (“packets” or “datagrams”). The IP packets exchangedbetween TARP terminals via TARP routers are actually encrypted packetswhose true destination address is concealed except to TARP routers andservers. The normal or “clear” or “outside” IP header attached to TARPIP packets contains only the address of a next hop router or destinationserver. That is, instead of indicating a final destination in thedestination field of the IP header, the TARP packet's IP header alwayspoints to a next-hop in a series of TARP router hops, or to the finaldestination. This means there is no overt indication from an interceptedTARP packet of the true destination of the TARP packet since thedestination could always be next-hop TARP router as well as the finaldestination.

Each TARP packet's true destination is concealed behind a layer ofencryption generated using a link key. The link key is the encryptionkey used for encrypted communication between the hops interveningbetween an originating TARP terminal and a destination TARP terminal.Each TARP router can remove the outer layer of encryption to reveal thedestination router for each TARP packet. To identify the link key neededto decrypt the outer layer of encryption of a TARP packet, a receivingTARP or routing terminal may identify the transmitting terminal by thesender/receiver IP numbers in the cleartext IP header.

Once the outer layer of encryption is removed, the TARP routerdetermines the final destination. Each TARP packet 140 undergoes aminimum number of hops to help foil traffic analysis. The hops may bechosen at random or by a fixed value. As a result, each TARP packet maymake random trips among a number of geographically disparate routersbefore reaching its destination. Each trip is highly likely to bedifferent for each packet composing a given message because each trip isindependently randomly determined. This feature is called agile routing.The fact that different packets take different routes provides distinctadvantages by making it difficult for an interloper to obtain all thepackets forming an entire multi-packet message. The associatedadvantages have to do with the inner layer of encryption discussedbelow. Agile routing is combined with another feature that furthers thispurpose; a feature that ensures that any message is broken into multiplepackets.

The IP address of a TARP router can be changed, a feature called IPagility. Each TARP router, independently or under direction from anotherTARP terminal or router, can change its IP address. A separate,unchangeable identifier or address is also defined. This address, calledthe TARP address, is known only to TARP routers and terminals and may becorrelated at any time by a TARP router or a TARP terminal using aLookup Table (LUT). When a TARP router or terminal changes its IPaddress, it updates the other TARP routers and terminals which in turnupdate their respective LUTs.

The message payload is hidden behind an inner layer of encryption in theTARP packet that can only be unlocked using a session key. The sessionkey is not available to any of the intervening TARP routers. The sessionkey is used to decrypt the payloads of the TARP packets permitting thedata stream to be reconstructed.

Communication may be made private using link and session keys, which inturn may be shared and used according to any desired method. Forexample, public/private keys or symmetric keys may be used.

To transmit a data stream, a TARP originating terminal constructs aseries of TARP packets from a series of IP packets generated by anetwork (IP) layer process. (Note that the terms “network layer,” “datalink layer,” “application layer,” etc. used in this specificationcorrespond to the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) networkterminology.) The payloads of these packets are assembled into a blockand chain-block encrypted using the session key. This assumes, ofcourse, that all the IP packets are destined for the same TARP terminal.The block is then interleaved and the interleaved encrypted block isbroken into a series of payloads, one for each TARP packet to begenerated. Special TARP headers IP_(T) are then added to each payloadusing the IP headers from the data stream packets. The TARP headers canbe identical to normal IP headers or customized in some way. They shouldcontain a formula or data for deinterleaving the data at the destinationTARP terminal, a time-to-live (TTL) parameter to indicate the number ofhops still to be executed, a data type identifier which indicateswhether the payload contains, for example, TCP or UDP data, the sender'sTARP address, the destination TARP address, and an indicator as towhether the packet contains real or decoy data or a formula forfiltering out decoy data if decoy data is spread in some way through theTARP payload data.

Note that although chain-block encryption is discussed here withreference to the session key, any encryption method may be used.Preferably, as in chain block encryption, a method should be used thatmakes unauthorized decryption difficult without an entire result of theencryption process. Thus, by separating the encrypted block amongmultiple packets and making it difficult for an interloper to obtainaccess to all of such packets, the contents of the communications areprovided an extra layer of security.

Decoy or dummy data can be added to a stream to help foil trafficanalysis by reducing the peak-to-average network load. It may bedesirable to provide the TARP process with an ability to respond to thetime of day or other criteria to generate more decoy data during lowtraffic periods so that communication bursts at one point in theInternet cannot be tied to communication bursts at another point toreveal the communicating endpoints.

Dummy data also helps to break the data into a larger number ofinconspicuously-sized packets permitting the interleave window size tobe increased while maintaining a reasonable size for each packet. (Thepacket size can be a single standard size or selected from a fixed rangeof sizes.) One primary reason for desiring for each message to be brokeninto multiple packets is apparent if a chain block encryption scheme isused to form the first encryption layer prior to interleaving. A singleblock encryption may be applied to a portion, or entirety, of a message,and that portion or entirety then interleaved into a number of separatepackets. Considering the agile IP routing of the packets, and theattendant difficulty of reconstructing an entire sequence of packets toform a single block-encrypted message element, decoy packets cansignificantly increase the difficulty of reconstructing an entire datastream.

The above scheme may be implemented entirely by processes operatingbetween the data link layer and the network layer of each server orterminal participating in the TARP system. Because the encryption systemdescribed above is insertable between the data link and network layers,the processes involved in supporting the encrypted communication may becompletely transparent to processes at the IP (network) layer and above.The TARP processes may also be completely transparent to the data linklayer processes as well. Thus, no operations at or above the Networklayer, or at or below the data link layer, are affected by the insertionof the TARP stack. This provides additional security to all processes ator above the network layer, since the difficulty of unauthorizedpenetration of the network layer (by, for example, a hacker) isincreased substantially. Even newly developed servers running at thesession layer leave all processes below the session layer vulnerable toattack. Note that in this architecture, security is distributed. Thatis, notebook computers used by executives on the road, for example, cancommunicate over the Internet without any compromise in security.

IP address changes made by TARP terminals and routers can be done atregular intervals, at random intervals, or upon detection of “attacks.”The variation of IP addresses hinders traffic analysis that might revealwhich computers are communicating, and also provides a degree ofimmunity from attack. The level of immunity from attack is roughlyproportional to the rate at which the IP address of the host ischanging.

As mentioned, IP addresses may be changed in response to attacks. Anattack may be revealed, for example, by a regular series of messagesindicating that a router is being probed in some way. Upon detection ofan attack, the TARP layer process may respond to this event by changingits IP address. In addition, it may create a subprocess that maintainsthe original IP address and continues interacting with the attacker insome manner.

Decoy packets may be generated by each TARP terminal on some basisdetermined by an algorithm. For example, the algorithm may be a randomone which calls for the generation of a packet on a random basis whenthe terminal is idle. Alternatively, the algorithm may be responsive totime of day or detection of low traffic to generate more decoy packetsduring low traffic times. Note that packets are preferably generated ingroups, rather than one by one, the groups being sized to simulate realmessages. In addition, so that decoy packets may be inserted in normalTARP message streams, the background loop may have a latch that makes itmore likely to insert decoy packets when a message stream is beingreceived. Alternatively, if a large number of decoy packets is receivedalong with regular TARP packets, the algorithm may increase the rate ofdropping of decoy packets rather than forwarding them. The result ofdropping and generating decoy packets in this way is to make theapparent incoming message size different from the apparent outgoingmessage size to help foil traffic analysis.

In various other embodiments of the invention, a scalable version of thesystem may be constructed in which a plurality of IP addresses arepreassigned to each pair of communicating nodes in the network. Eachpair of nodes agrees upon an algorithm for “hopping” between IPaddresses (both sending and receiving), such that an eavesdropper seesapparently continuously random IP address pairs (source and destination)for packets transmitted between the pair. Overlapping or “reusable” IPaddresses may be allocated to different users on the same subnet, sinceeach node merely verifies that a particular packet includes a validsource/destination pair from the agreed-upon algorithm.Source/destination pairs are preferably not reused between any two nodesduring any given end-to-end session, though limited IP block sizes orlengthy sessions might require it.

Further improvements described in this continuation-in-part applicationinclude: (1) a load balancer that distributes packets across differenttransmission paths according to transmission path quality; (2) a DNSproxy server that transparently creates a virtual private network inresponse to a domain name inquiry; (3) a large-to-small link bandwidthmanagement feature that prevents denial-of service attacks at systemchokepoints; (4) a traffic limiter that regulates incoming packets bylimiting the rate at which a transmitter can be synchronized with areceiver; and (5) a signaling synchronizer that allows a large number ofnodes to communicate with a central node by partitioning thecommunication function between two separate entities.

The present invention provides key technologies for implementing asecure virtual Internet by using a new agile network protocol that isbuilt on top of the existing Internet protocol (IP). The secure virtualInternet works over the existing Internet infrastructure, and interfaceswith client applications the same way as the existing Internet. The keytechnologies provided by the present invention that support the securevirtual Internet include a “one-click” and “no-click” technique tobecome part of the secure virtual Internet, a secure domain name service(SDNS) for the secure virtual Internet, and a new approach forinterfacing specific client applications onto the secure virtualInternet. According to the invention, the secure domain name serviceinterfaces with existing applications, in addition to providing a way toregister and serve domain names and addresses.

According to one aspect of the present invention, a user canconveniently establish a VPN using a “one-click” or a “no-click”technique without being required to enter user identificationinformation, a password and/or an encryption key for establishing a VPN.The advantages of the present invention are provided by a method forestablishing a secure communication link between a first computer and asecond computer over a computer network, such as the Internet. In oneembodiment, a secure communication mode is enabled at a first computerwithout a user entering any cryptographic information for establishingthe secure communication mode of communication, preferably by merelyselecting an icon displayed on the first computer. Alternatively, thesecure communication mode of communication can be enabled by entering acommand into the first computer. Then, a secure communication link isestablished between the first computer and a second computer over acomputer network based on the enabled secure communication mode ofcommunication. According to the invention, it is determined whether asecure communication software module is stored on the first computer inresponse to the step of enabling the secure communication mode ofcommunication. A predetermined computer network address is then accessedfor loading the secure communication software module when the softwaremodule is not stored on the first computer. Subsequently, the proxysoftware module is stored in the first computer. The securecommunication link is a virtual private network communication link overthe computer network. Preferably, the virtual private network can bebased on inserting into each data packet one or more data values thatvary according to a pseudo-random sequence. Alternatively, the virtualprivate network can be based on a computer network address hoppingregime that is used to pseudorandomly change computer network addressesor other data values in packets transmitted between the first computerand the second computer, such that the second computer compares the datavalues in each data packet transmitted between the first computer andthe second computer to a moving window of valid values. Yet anotheralternative provides that the virtual private network can be based on acomparison between a discriminator field in each data packet to a tableof valid discriminator fields maintained for the first computer.

According to another aspect of the invention, a command is entered todefine a setup parameter associated with the secure communication linkmode of communication. Consequently, the secure communication mode isautomatically established when a communication link is established overthe computer network.

The present invention also provides a computer system having acommunication link to a computer network, and a display showing ahyperlink for establishing a virtual private network through thecomputer network. When the hyperlink for establishing the virtualprivate network is selected, a virtual private network is establishedover the computer network. A non-standard top-level domain name is thensent over the virtual private network communication to a predeterminedcomputer network address, such as a computer network address for asecure domain name service (SDNS).

The present invention provides a domain name service that providessecure computer network addresses for secure, non-standard top-leveldomain names. The advantages of the present invention are provided by asecure domain name service for a computer network that includes a portalconnected to a computer network, such as the Internet, and a domain namedatabase connected to the computer network through the portal. Accordingto the invention, the portal authenticates a query for a secure computernetwork address, and the domain name database stores secure computernetwork addresses for the computer network. Each secure computer networkaddress is based on a non-standard top-level domain name, such as .scom,.sorg, .snet, .snet, .sedu, .smil and .sint.

The present invention provides a way to encapsulate existing applicationnetwork traffic at the application layer of a client computer so thatthe client application can securely communicate with a server protectedby an agile network protocol. The advantages of the present inventionare provided by a method for communicating using a private communicationlink between a client computer and a server computer over a computernetwork, such as the Internet. According to the invention, aninformation packet is sent from the client computer to the servercomputer over the computer network. The information packet contains datathat is inserted into the payload portion of the packet at theapplication layer of the client computer and is used for forming avirtual private connection between the client computer and the servercomputer. The modified information packet can be sent through a firewallbefore being sent over the computer network to the server computer andby working on top of existing protocols (i.e., UDP, ICMP and TCP), thepresent invention more easily penetrates the firewall. The informationpacket is received at a kernel layer of an operating system on theserver side. It is then determined at the kernel layer of the operatingsystem on the host computer whether the information packet contains thedata that is used for forming the virtual private connection. The serverside replies by sending an information packet to the client computerthat has been modified at the kernel layer to containing virtual privateconnection information in the payload portion of the reply informationpacket. Preferably, the information packet from the client computer andthe reply information packet from the server side are each a UDPprotocol information packet. Alternative, both information packets couldbe a TCP/IP protocol information packet, or an ICMP protocol informationpacket.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

FIG. 1 is an illustration of secure communications over the Internetaccording to a prior art embodiment.

FIG. 2 is an illustration of secure communications over the Internetaccording to an embodiment of the invention.

FIG. 3 a is an illustration of a process of forming a tunneled IP packetaccording to an embodiment of the invention.

FIG. 3 b is an illustration of a process of forming a tunneled IP packetaccording to another embodiment of the invention.

FIG. 4 is an illustration of an OSI layer location of processes that maybe used to implement the invention.

FIG. 5 is a flow chart illustrating a process for routing a tunneledpacket according to an embodiment of the invention.

FIG. 6 is a flow chart illustrating a process for forming a tunneledpacket according to an embodiment of the invention.

FIG. 7 is a flow chart illustrating a process for receiving a tunneledpacket according to an embodiment of the invention.

FIG. 8 shows how a secure session is established and synchronizedbetween a client and a TARP router.

FIG. 9 shows an IP address hopping scheme between a client computer andTARP router using transmit and receive tables in each computer.

FIG. 10 shows physical link redundancy among three Internet ServiceProviders (ISPs) and a client computer.

FIG. 11 shows how multiple IP packets can be embedded into a single“frame” such as an Ethernet frame, and further shows the use of adiscriminator field to camouflage true packet recipients.

FIG. 12A shows a system that employs hopped hardware addresses, hoppedIP addresses, and hopped discriminator fields.

FIG. 12B shows several different approaches for hopping hardwareaddresses, IP addresses, and discriminator fields in combination.

FIG. 13 shows a technique for automatically re-establishingsynchronization between sender and receiver through the use of apartially public sync value.

FIG. 14 shows a “checkpoint” scheme for regaining synchronizationbetween a sender and recipient.

FIG. 15 shows further details of the checkpoint scheme of FIG. 14.

FIG. 16 shows how two addresses can be decomposed into a plurality ofsegments for comparison with presence vectors.

FIG. 17 shows a storage array for a receiver's active addresses.

FIG. 18 shows the receiver's storage array after receiving a syncrequest.

FIG. 19 shows the receiver's storage array after new addresses have beengenerated.

FIG. 20 shows a system employing distributed transmission paths.

FIG. 21 shows a plurality of link transmission tables that can be usedto route packets in the system of FIG. 20.

FIG. 22A shows a flowchart for adjusting weight value distributionsassociated with a plurality of transmission links

FIG. 22B shows a flowchart for setting a weight value to zero if atransmitter turns off.

FIG. 23 shows a system employing distributed transmission paths withadjusted weight value distributions for each path.

FIG. 24 shows an example using the system of FIG. 23.

FIG. 25 shows a conventional domain-name look-up service.

FIG. 26 shows a system employing a DNS proxy server with transparent VPNcreation.

FIG. 27 shows steps that can be carried out to implement transparent VPNcreation based on a DNS look-up function.

FIG. 28 shows a system including a link guard function that preventspacket overloading on a low-bandwidth link LOW BW.

FIG. 29 shows one embodiment of a system employing the principles ofFIG. 28.

FIG. 30 shows a system that regulates packet transmission rates bythrottling the rate at which synchronizations are performed.

FIG. 31 shows a signaling server 3101 and a transport server 3102 usedto establish a VPN with a client computer.

FIG. 32 shows message flows relating to synchronization protocols ofFIG.

31.

FIG. 33 shows a system block diagram of a computer network in which the“one-click” secure communication link of the present invention issuitable for use.

FIG. 34 shows a flow diagram for installing and establishing a“one-click” secure communication link over a computer network accordingto the present invention.

FIG. 35 shows a flow diagram for registering a secure domain nameaccording to the present invention.

FIG. 36 shows a system block diagram of a computer network in which aprivate connection according to the present invention can be configuredto more easily traverse a firewall between two computer networks.

FIG. 37 shows a flow diagram for establishing a virtual privateconnection that is encapsulated using an existing network protocol.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION

Referring to FIG. 2, a secure mechanism for communicating over theinternet employs a number of special routers or servers, called TARProuters 122-127 that are similar to regular IP routers 128-132 in thateach has one or more IP addresses and uses normal IP protocol to sendnormal-looking IP packet messages, called TARP packets 140. TARP packets140 are identical to normal IP packet messages that are routed byregular IP routers 128-132 because each TARP packet 140 contains adestination address as in a normal IP packet. However, instead ofindicating a final destination in the destination field of the IPheader, the TARP packet's 140 IP header always points to a next-hop in aseries of TARP router hops, or the final destination, TARP terminal 110.Because the header of the TARP packet contains only the next-hopdestination, there is no overt indication from an intercepted TARPpacket of the true destination of the TARP packet 140 since thedestination could always be the next-hop TARP router as well as thefinal destination, TARP terminal 110.

Each TARP packet's true destination is concealed behind an outer layerof encryption generated using a link key 146. The link key 146 is theencryption key used for encrypted communication between the end points(TARP terminals or TARP routers) of a single link in the chain of hopsconnecting the originating TARP terminal 100 and the destination TARPterminal 110. Each TARP router 122-127, using the link key 146 it usesto communicate with the previous hop in a chain, can use the link key toreveal the true destination of a TARP packet. To identify the link keyneeded to decrypt the outer layer of encryption of a TARP packet, areceiving TARP or routing terminal may identify the transmittingterminal (which may indicate the link key used) by the sender field ofthe clear IP header. Alternatively, this identity may be hidden behindanother layer of encryption in available bits in the clear IP header.Each TARP router, upon receiving a TARP message, determines if themessage is a TARP message by using authentication data in the TARPpacket. This could be recorded in available bytes in the TARP packet'sIP header. Alternatively, TARP packets could be authenticated byattempting to decrypt using the link key 146 and determining if theresults are as expected. The former may have computational advantagesbecause it does not involve a decryption process.

Once the outer layer of decryption is completed by a TARP router122-127, the TARP router determines the final destination. The system ispreferably designed to cause each TARP packet 140 to undergo a minimumnumber of hops to help foil traffic analysis. The time to live counterin the IP header of the TARP message may be used to indicate a number ofTARP router hops yet to be completed. Each TARP router then woulddecrement the counter and determine from that whether it should forwardthe TARP packet 140 to another TARP router 122-127 or to the destinationTARP terminal 110. If the time to live counter is zero or below zeroafter decrementing, for an example of usage, the TARP router receivingthe TARP packet 140 may forward the TARP packet 140 to the destinationTARP terminal 110. If the time to live counter is above zero afterdecrementing, for an example of usage, the TARP router receiving theTARP packet 140 may forward the TARP packet 140 to a TARP router 122-127that the current TARP terminal chooses at random. As a result, each TARPpacket 140 is routed through some minimum number of hops of TARP routers122-127 which are chosen at random.

Thus, each TARP packet, irrespective of the traditional factorsdetermining traffic in the Internet, makes random trips among a numberof geographically disparate routers before reaching its destination andeach trip is highly likely to be different for each packet composing agiven message because each trip is independently randomly determined asdescribed above. This feature is called agile routing. For reasons thatwill become clear shortly, the fact that different packets takedifferent routes provides distinct advantages by making it difficult foran interloper to obtain all the packets forming an entire multi-packetmessage. Agile routing is combined with another feature that furthersthis purpose, a feature that ensures that any message is broken intomultiple packets.

A TARP router receives a TARP packet when an IP address used by the TARProuter coincides with the IP address in the TARP packet's IP header IPc.The IP address of a TARP router, however, may not remain constant. Toavoid and manage attacks, each TARP router, independently or underdirection from another TARP terminal or router, may change its IPaddress. A separate, unchangeable identifier or address is also defined.This address, called the TARP address, is known only to TARP routers andterminals and may be correlated at any time by a TARP router or a TARPterminal using a Lookup Table (LUT). When a TARP router or terminalchanges its IP address, it updates the other TARP routers and terminalswhich in turn update their respective LUTs. In reality, whenever a TARProuter looks up the address of a destination in the encrypted header, itmust convert a TARP address to a real IP address using its LUT.

While every TARP router receiving a TARP packet has the ability todetermine the packet's final destination, the message payload isembedded behind an inner layer of encryption in the TARP packet that canonly be unlocked using a session key. The session key is not availableto any of the TARP routers 122-127 intervening between the originating100 and destination 110 TARP terminals. The session key is used todecrypt the payloads of the TARP packets 140 permitting an entiremessage to be reconstructed.

In one embodiment, communication may be made private using link andsession keys, which in turn may be shared and used according any desiredmethod. For example, a public key or symmetric keys may be communicatedbetween link or session endpoints using a public key method. Any of avariety of other mechanisms for securing data to ensure that onlyauthorized computers can have access to the private information in theTARP packets 140 may be used as desired.

Referring to FIG. 3 a, to construct a series of TARP packets, a datastream 300 of IP packets 207 a, 207 b, 207 c, etc., such series ofpackets being formed by a network (IP) layer process, is broken into aseries of small sized segments. In the present example, equal-sizedsegments 1-9 are defined and used to construct a set of interleaved datapackets A, B, and C. Here it is assumed that the number of interleavedpackets A, B, and C formed is three and that the number of IP packets207 a -207 c used to form the three interleaved packets A, B, and C isexactly three. Of course, the number of IP packets spread over a groupof interleaved packets may be any convenient number as may be the numberof interleaved packets over which the incoming data stream is spread.The latter, the number of interleaved packets over which the data streamis spread, is called the interleave window.

To create a packet, the transmitting software interleaves the normal IPpackets 207 a et. seq, to form a new set of interleaved payload data320. This payload data 320 is then encrypted using a session key to forma set of session-key-encrypted payload data 330, each of which, A, B,and C, will form the payload of a TARP packet. Using the IP header data,from the original packets 207 a-207 c, new TARP headers IPT are formed.The TARP headers IPT can be identical to normal IP headers or customizedin some way. In a preferred embodiment, the TARP headers IPT are IPheaders with added data providing the following information required forrouting and reconstruction of messages, some of which data isordinarily, or capable of being, contained in normal IP headers:

1. A window sequence number—an identifier that indicates where thepacket belongs in the original message sequence.

2. An interleave sequence number—an identifier that indicates theinterleaving sequence used to form the packet so that the packet can bedeinterleaved along with other packets in the interleave window.

3. A time-to-live (TTL) datum—indicates the number of TARP-router-hopsto be executed before the packet reaches its destination. Note that theTTL parameter may provide a datum to be used in a probabilistic formulafor determining whether to route the packet to the destination or toanother hop.

4. Data type identifier—indicates whether the payload contains, forexample, TCP or UDP data.

5. Sender's address—indicates the sender's address in the TARP network.

6. Destination address—indicates the destination terminal's address inthe TARP network.

7. Decoy/Real—an indicator of whether the packet contains real messagedata or dummy decoy data or a combination.

Obviously, the packets going into a single interleave window mustinclude only packets with a common destination. Thus, it is assumed inthe depicted example that the IP headers of IP packets 207 a -207 c allcontain the same destination address or at least will be received by thesame terminal so that they can be deinterleaved. Note that dummy ordecoy data or packets can be added to form a larger interleave windowthan would otherwise be required by the size of a given message. Decoyor dummy data can be added to a stream to help foil traffic analysis byleveling the load on the network. Thus, it may be desirable to providethe TARP process with an ability to respond to the time of day or othercriteria to generate more decoy data during low traffic periods so thatcommunication bursts at one point in the Internet cannot be tied tocommunication bursts at another point to reveal the communicatingendpoints.

Dummy data also helps to break the data into a larger number ofinconspicuously-sized packets permitting the interleave window size tobe increased while maintaining a reasonable size for each packet. (Thepacket size can be a single standard size or selected from a fixed rangeof sizes.) One primary reason for desiring for each message to be brokeninto multiple packets is apparent if a chain block encryption scheme isused to form the first encryption layer prior to interleaving. A singleblock encryption may be applied to a portion, or the entirety, of amessage, and that portion or entirety then interleaved into a number ofseparate packets.

Referring to FIG. 3 b, in an alternative mode of TARP packetconstruction, a series of IP packets are accumulated to make up apredefined interleave window. The payloads of the packets are used toconstruct a single block 520 for chain block encryption using thesession key. The payloads used to form the block are presumed to bedestined for the same terminal. The block size may coincide with theinterleave window as depicted in the example embodiment of FIG. 3 b.After encryption, the encrypted block is broken into separate payloadsand segments which are interleaved as in the embodiment of FIG. 3 a. Theresulting interleaved packets A, B, and C, are then packaged as TARPpackets with TARP headers as in the Example of FIG. 3 a. The remainingprocess is as shown in, and discussed with reference to, FIG. 3 a.

Once the TARP packets 340 are formed, each entire TARP packet 340,including the TARP header IPT, is encrypted using the link key forcommunication with the first-hop-TARP router. The first hop TARP routeris randomly chosen. A final unencrypted IP header IPc is added to eachencrypted TARP packet 340 to form a normal IP packet 360 that can betransmitted to a TARP router. Note that the process of constructing theTARP packet 360 does not have to be done in stages as described. Theabove description is just a useful heuristic for describing the finalproduct, namely, the TARP packet.

Note that, TARP header IP_(T) could be a completely custom headerconfiguration with no similarity to a normal IP header except that itcontain the information identified above. This is so since this headeris interpreted by only TARP routers.

The above scheme may be implemented entirely by processes operatingbetween the data link layer and the network layer of each server orterminal participating in the TARP system. Referring to FIG. 4, a TARPtransceiver 405 can be an originating terminal 100, a destinationterminal 110, or a TARP router 122-127. In each TARP Transceiver 405, atransmitting process is generated to receive normal packets from theNetwork (IP) layer and generate TARP packets for communication over thenetwork. A receiving process is generated to receive normal IP packetscontaining TARP packets and generate from these normal IP packets whichare “passed up” to the Network (IP) layer. Note that where the TARPTransceiver 405 is a router, the received TARP packets 140 are notprocessed into a stream of IP packets 415 because they need only beauthenticated as proper TARP packets and then passed to another TARProuter or a TARP destination terminal 110. The intervening process, a“TARP Layer” 420, could be combined with either the data link layer 430or the Network layer 410. In either case, it would intervene between thedata link layer 430 so that the process would receive regular IP packetscontaining embedded TARP packets and “hand up” a series of reassembledIP packets to the Network layer 410. As an example of combining the TARPlayer 420 with the data link layer 430, a program may augment the normalprocesses running a communications card, for example, an Ethernet card.Alternatively, the TARP layer processes may form part of a dynamicallyloadable module that is loaded and executed to support communicationsbetween the network and data link layers.

Because the encryption system described above can be inserted betweenthe data link and network layers, the processes involved in supportingthe encrypted communication may be completely transparent to processesat the IP (network) layer and above. The TARP processes may also becompletely transparent to the data link layer processes as well. Thus,no operations at or above the network layer, or at or below the datalink layer, are affected by the insertion of the TARP stack. Thisprovides additional security to all processes at or above the networklayer, since the difficulty of unauthorized penetration of the networklayer (by, for example, a hacker) is increased substantially. Even newlydeveloped servers running at the session layer leave all processes belowthe session layer vulnerable to attack. Note that in this architecture,security is distributed. That is, notebook computers used by executiveson the road, for example, can communicate over the Internet without anycompromise in security.

Note that IP address changes made by TARP terminals and routers can bedone at regular intervals, at random intervals, or upon detection of“attacks.” The variation of IP addresses hinders traffic analysis thatmight reveal which computers are communicating, and also provides adegree of immunity from attack. The level of immunity from attack isroughly proportional to the rate at which the IP address of the host ischanging.

As mentioned, IP addresses may be changed in response to attacks. Anattack may be revealed, for example, by a regular series of messagesindicates that a router is being probed in some way. Upon detection ofan attack, the TARP layer process may respond to this event by changingits IP address. To accomplish this, the TARP process will construct aTARP-formatted message, in the style of Internet Control MessageProtocol (ICMP) datagrams as an example; this message will contain themachine's TARP address, its previous IP address, and its new IP address.The TARP layer will transmit this packet to at least one known TARProuter; then upon receipt and validation of the message, the TARP routerwill update its LUT with the new IP address for the stated TARP address.The TARP router will then format a similar message, and broadcast it tothe other TARP routers so that they may update their LUTs. Since thetotal number of TARP routers on any given subnet is expected to berelatively small, this process of updating the LUTs should be relativelyfast. It may not, however, work as well when there is a relatively largenumber of TARP routers and/or a relatively large number of clients; thishas motivated a refinement of this architecture to provide scalability;this refinement has led to a second embodiment, which is discussedbelow.

Upon detection of an attack, the TARP process may also create asubprocess that maintains the original IP address and continuesinteracting with the attacker. The latter may provide an opportunity totrace the attacker or study the attacker's methods (called “fishbowling”drawing upon the analogy of a small fish in a fish bowl that “thinks” itis in the ocean but is actually under captive observation). A history ofthe communication between the attacker and the abandoned (fishbowled) IPaddress can be recorded or transmitted for human analysis or furthersynthesized for purposes of responding in some way.

As mentioned above, decoy or dummy data or packets can be added tooutgoing data streams by TARP terminals or routers. In addition tomaking it convenient to spread data over a larger number of separatepackets, such decoy packets can also help to level the load on inactiveportions of the Internet to help foil traffic analysis efforts.

Decoy packets may be generated by each TARP terminal 100, 110 or eachrouter 122-127 on some basis determined by an algorithm. For example,the algorithm may be a random one which calls for the generation of apacket on a random basis when the terminal is idle. Alternatively, thealgorithm may be responsive to time of day or detection of low trafficto generate more decoy packets during low traffic times. Note thatpackets are preferably generated in groups, rather than one by one, thegroups being sized to simulate real messages. In addition, so that decoypackets may be inserted in normal TARP message streams, the backgroundloop may have a latch that makes it more likely to insert decoy packetswhen a message stream is being received. That is, when a series ofmessages are received, the decoy packet generation rate may beincreased. Alternatively, if a large number of decoy packets is receivedalong with regular TARP packets, the algorithm may increase the rate ofdropping of decoy packets rather than forwarding them. The result ofdropping and generating decoy packets in this way is to make theapparent incoming message size different from the apparent outgoingmessage size to help foil traffic analysis. The rate of reception ofpackets, decoy or otherwise, may be indicated to the decoy packetdropping and generating processes through perishable decoy and regularpacket counters. (A perishable counter is one that resets or decrementsits value in response to time so that it contains a high value when itis incremented in rapid succession and a small value when incrementedeither slowly or a small number of times in rapid succession.) Note thatdestination TARP terminal 110 may generate decoy packets equal in numberand size to those TARP packets received to make it appear it is merelyrouting packets and is therefore not the destination terminal.

Referring to FIG. 5, the following particular steps may be employed inthe above-described method for routing TARP packets.

-   -   S0. A background loop operation is performed which applies an        algorithm which determines the generation of decoy IP packets.        The loop is interrupted when an encrypted TARP packet is        received.    -   S2. The TARP packet may be probed in some way to authenticate        the packet before attempting to decrypt it using the link key.        That is, the router may determine that the packet is an        authentic TARP packet by performing a selected operation on some        data included with the clear IP header attached to the encrypted        TARP packet contained in the payload. This makes it possible to        avoid performing decryption on packets that are not authentic        TARP packets.    -   S3. The TARP packet is decrypted to expose the destination TARP        address and an indication of whether the packet is a decoy        packet or part of a real message.    -   S4. If the packet is a decoy packet, the perishable decoy        counter is incremented.    -   S5. Based on the decoy generation/dropping algorithm and the        perishable decoy counter value, if the packet is a decoy packet,        the router may choose to throw it away. If the received packet        is a decoy packet and it is determined that it should be thrown        away (S6), control returns to step S0.    -   S7. The TTL parameter of the TARP header is decremented and it        is determined if the TTL parameter is greater than zero.    -   S8. If the TTL parameter is greater than zero, a TARP address is        randomly chosen from a list of TARP addresses maintained by the        router and the link key and IP address corresponding to that        TARP address memorized for use in creating a new IP packet        containing the TARP packet.    -   S9. If the TTL parameter is zero or less, the link key and IP        address corresponding to the TARP address of the destination are        memorized for use in creating the new IP packet containing the        TARP packet.    -   S10. The TARP packet is encrypted using the memorized link key.    -   S11. An IP header is added to the packet that contains the        stored IP address, the encrypted TARP packet wrapped with an IP        header, and the completed packet transmitted to the next hop or        destination.

Referring to FIG. 6, the following particular steps may be employed inthe above- described method for generating TARP packets.

-   -   S20. A background loop operation applies an algorithm that        determines the generation of decoy IP packets. The loop is        interrupted when a data stream containing IP packets is received        for transmission.    -   S21. The received IP packets are grouped into a set consisting        of messages with a constant IP destination address. The set is        further broken down to coincide with a maximum size of an        interleave window The set is encrypted, and interleaved into a        set of payloads destined to become TARP packets.    -   S22. The TARP address corresponding to the IP address is        determined from a lookup table and stored to generate the TARP        header. An initial TTL count is generated and stored in the        header. The TTL count may be random with minimum and maximum        values or it may be fixed or determined by some other parameter.    -   S23. The window sequence numbers and interleave sequence numbers        are recorded in the TARP headers of each packet.    -   S24. One TARP router address is randomly chosen for each TARP        packet and the IP address corresponding to it stored for use in        the clear IP header. The link key corresponding to this router        is identified and used to encrypt TARP packets containing        interleaved and encrypted data and TARP headers.    -   S25. A clear IP header with the first hop router's real IP        address is generated and added to each of the encrypted TARP        packets and the resulting packets.

Referring to FIG. 7, the following particular steps may be employed inthe above-described method for receiving TARP packets.

-   -   S40. A background loop operation is performed which applies an        algorithm which determines the generation of decoy IP packets.        The loop is interrupted when an encrypted TARP packet is        received.    -   S42. The TARP packet may be probed to authenticate the packet        before attempting to decrypt it using the link key.    -   S43. The TARP packet is decrypted with the appropriate link key        to expose the destination TARP address and an indication of        whether the packet is a decoy packet or part of a real message.    -   S44. If the packet is a decoy packet, the perishable decoy        counter is incremented.    -   S45. Based on the decoy generation/dropping algorithm and the        perishable decoy counter value, if the packet is a decoy packet,        the receiver may choose to throw it away.    -   S46. The TARP packets are cached until all packets forming an        interleave window are received.    -   S47. Once all packets of an interleave window are received, the        packets are deinterleaved.    -   S48. The packets block of combined packets defining the        interleave window is then decrypted using the session key.    -   S49. The decrypted block is then divided using the window        sequence data and the IP_(T) headers are converted into normal        IP_(C) headers. The window sequence numbers are integrated in        the IP_(C) headers.    -   S50. The packets are then handed up to the IP layer processes.

1. Scalability Enhancements

The IP agility feature described above relies on the ability to transmitIP address changes to all TARP routers. The embodiments including thisfeature will be referred to as “boutique” embodiments due to potentiallimitations in scaling these features up for a large network, such asthe Internet. (The “boutique” embodiments would, however, be robust foruse in smaller networks, such as small virtual private networks, forexample). One problem with the boutique embodiments is that if IPaddress changes are to occur frequently, the message traffic required toupdate all routers sufficiently quickly creates a serious burden on theInternet when the TARP router and/or client population gets large. Thebandwidth burden added to the networks, for example in ICMP packets,that would be used to update all the TARP routers could overwhelm theInternet for a large scale implementation that approached the scale ofthe Internet. In other words, the boutique system's scalability islimited.

A system can be constructed which trades some of the features of theabove embodiments to provide the benefits of IP agility without theadditional messaging burden. This is accomplished by IP address-hoppingaccording to shared algorithms that govern IP addresses used betweenlinks participating in communications sessions between nodes such asTARP nodes. (Note that the IP hopping technique is also applicable tothe boutique embodiment.) The IP agility feature discussed with respectto the boutique system can be modified so that it becomes decentralizedunder this scalable regime and governed by the above-described sharedalgorithm. Other features of the boutique system may be combined withthis new type of IP-agility.

The new embodiment has the advantage of providing IP agility governed bya local algorithm and set of IP addresses exchanged by eachcommunicating pair of nodes. This local governance issession-independent in that it may govern communications between a pairof nodes, irrespective of the session or end points being transferredbetween the directly communicating pair of nodes.

In the scalable embodiments, blocks of IP addresses are allocated toeach node in the network. (This scalability will increase in the future,when Internet Protocol addresses are increased to 128-bit fields, vastlyincreasing the number of distinctly addressable nodes). Each node canthus use any of the IP addresses assigned to that node to communicatewith other nodes in the network. Indeed, each pair of communicatingnodes can use a plurality of source IP addresses and destination IPaddresses for communicating with each other.

Each communicating pair of nodes in a chain participating in any sessionstores two blocks of IP addresses, called netblocks, and an algorithmand randomization seed for selecting, from each netblock, the next pairof source/destination IP addresses that will be used to transmit thenext message. In other words, the algorithm governs the sequentialselection of IP-address pairs, one sender and one receiver IP address,from each netblock. The combination of algorithm, seed, and netblock (IPaddress block) will be called a “hopblock.” A router issues separatetransmit and receive hopblocks to its clients. The send address and thereceive address of the IP header of each outgoing packet sent by theclient are filled with the send and receive IP addresses generated bythe algorithm. The algorithm is “clocked” (indexed) by a counter so thateach time a pair is used, the algorithm turns out a new transmit pairfor the next packet to be sent.

The router's receive hopblock is identical to the client's transmithopblock. The router uses the receive hopblock to predict what the sendand receive IP address pair for the next expected packet from thatclient will be. Since packets can be received out of order, it is notpossible for the router to predict with certainty what IP address pairwill be on the next sequential packet. To account for this problem, therouter generates a range of predictions encompassing the number ofpossible transmitted packet send/receive addresses, of which the nextpacket received could leap ahead. Thus, if there is a vanishingly smallprobability that a given packet will arrive at the router ahead of 5packets transmitted by the client before the given packet, then therouter can generate a series of 6 send/receive IP address pairs (or “hopwindow”) to compare with the next received packet. When a packet isreceived, it is marked in the hop window as such, so that a secondpacket with the same IP address pair will be discarded. If anout-of-sequence packet does not arrive within a predetermined timeoutperiod, it can be requested for retransmission or simply discarded fromthe receive table, depending upon the protocol in use for thatcommunications session, or possibly by convention.

When the router receives the client's packet, it compares the send andreceive IP addresses of the packet with the next N predicted send andreceive IP address pairs and rejects the packet if it is not a member ofthis set. Received packets that do not have the predictedsource/destination IP addresses falling with the window are rejected,thus thwarting possible hackers. (With the number of possiblecombinations, even a fairly large window would be hard to fall into atrandom.) If it is a member of this set, the router accepts the packetand processes it further. This link-based IP-hopping strategy, referredto as “IHOP,” is a network element that stands on its own and is notnecessarily accompanied by elements of the boutique system describedabove. If the routing agility feature described in connection with theboutique embodiment is combined with this link-based IP-hoppingstrategy, the router's next step would be to decrypt the TARP header todetermine the destination TARP router for the packet and determine whatshould be the next hop for the packet. The TARP router would thenforward the packet to a random TARP router or the destination TARProuter with which the source TARP router has a link-based IP hoppingcommunication established.

FIG. 8 shows how a client computer 801 and a TARP router 811 canestablish a secure session. When client 801 seeks to establish an IHOPsession with TARP router 811, the client 801 sends “securesynchronization” request (“SSYN”) packet 821 to the TARP router 811.This SYN packet 821 contains the client's 801 authentication token, andmay be sent to the router 811 in an encrypted format. The source anddestination IP numbers on the packet 821 are the client's 801 currentfixed IP address, and a “known” fixed IP address for the router 811.(For security purposes, it may be desirable to reject any packets fromoutside of the local network that are destined for the router's knownfixed IP address.) Upon receipt and validation of the client's 801 SSYNpacket 821, the router 811 responds by sending an encrypted “securesynchronization acknowledgment” (“SSYN ACK”) 822 to the client 801. ThisSSYN ACK 822 will contain the transmit and receive hopblocks that theclient 801 will use when communicating with the TARP router 811. Theclient 801 will acknowledge the TARP router's 811 response packet 822 bygenerating an encrypted SSYN ACK ACK packet 823 which will be sent fromthe client's 801 fixed IP address and to the TARP router's 811 knownfixed IP address. The client 801 will simultaneously generate a SSYN ACKACK packet; this SSYN ACK packet, referred to as the Secure SessionInitiation (SSI) packet 824, will be sent with the first {sender,receiver} IP pair in the client's transmit table 921 (FIG. 9), asspecified in the transmit hopblock provided by the TARP router 811 inthe SSYN ACK packet 822. The TARP router 811 will respond to the SSIpacket 824 with an SSI ACK packet 825, which will be sent with the first{sender, receiver} IP pair in the TARP router's transmit table 923. Oncethese packets have been successfully exchanged, the securecommunications session is established, and all further securecommunications between the client 801 and the TARP router 811 will beconducted via this secure session, as long as synchronization ismaintained. If synchronization is lost, then the client 801 and TARProuter 802 may re-establish the secure session by the procedure outlinedin FIG. 8 and described above.

While the secure session is active, both the client 901 and TARP router911 (FIG. 9) will maintain their respective transmit tables 921, 923 andreceive tables 922, 924, as provided by the TARP router during sessionsynchronization 822. It is important that the sequence of IP pairs inthe client's transmit table 921 be identical to those in the TARProuter's receive table 924; similarly, the sequence of IP pairs in theclient's receive table 922 must be identical to those in the router'stransmit table 923. This is required for the session synchronization tobe maintained. The client 901 need maintain only one transmit table 921and one receive table 922 during the course of the secure session. Eachsequential packet sent by the client 901 will employ the next {send,receive} IP address pair in the transmit table, regardless of TCP or UDPsession. The TARP router 911 will expect each packet arriving from theclient 901 to bear the next IP address pair shown in its receive table.

Since packets can arrive out of order, however, the router 911 canmaintain a “look ahead” buffer in its receive table, and will markpreviously-received IP pairs as invalid for future packets; any futurepacket containing an IP pair that is in the look-ahead buffer but ismarked as previously received will be discarded. Communications from theTARP router 911 to the client 901 are maintained in an identical manner;in particular, the router 911 will select the next IP address pair fromits transmit table 923 when constructing a packet to send to the client901, and the client 901 will maintain a look-ahead buffer of expected IPpairs on packets that it is receiving. Each TARP router will maintainseparate pairs of transmit and receive tables for each client that iscurrently engaged in a secure session with or through that TARP router.

While clients receive their hopblocks from the first server linking themto the Internet, routers exchange hopblocks. When a router establishes alink-based IP-hopping communication regime with another router, eachrouter of the pair exchanges its transmit hopblock. The transmithopblock of each router becomes the receive hopblock of the otherrouter. The communication between routers is governed as described bythe example of a client sending a packet to the first router.

While the above strategy works fine in the IP milieu, many localnetworks that are connected to the Internet are Ethernet systems. InEthernet, the IP addresses of the destination devices must be translatedinto hardware addresses, and vice versa, using known processes (“addressresolution protocol,” and “reverse address resolution protocol”).However, if the link- based IP-hopping strategy is employed, thecorrelation process would become explosive and burdensome. Analternative to the link-based IP hopping strategy may be employed withinan Ethernet network. The solution is to provide that the node linkingthe Internet to the Ethernet (call it the border node) use thelink-based IP-hopping communication regime to communicate with nodesoutside the Ethernet LAN. Within the Ethernet LAN, each TARP node wouldhave a single IP address which would be addressed in the conventionalway. Instead of comparing the {sender, receiver} IP address pairs toauthenticate a packet, the intra-LAN TARP node would use one of the IPheader extension fields to do so. Thus, the border node uses analgorithm shared by the intra-LAN TARP node to generate a symbol that isstored in the free field in the IP header, and the intra-LAN TARP nodegenerates a range of symbols based on its prediction of the nextexpected packet to be received from that particular source IP address.The packet is rejected if it does not fall into the set of predictedsymbols (for example, numerical values) or is accepted if it does.Communications from the intra-LAN TARP node to the border node areaccomplished in the same manner, though the algorithm will necessarilybe different for security reasons. Thus, each of the communicating nodeswill generate transmit and receive tables in a similar manner to that ofFIG. 9; the intra-LAN TARP nodes transmit table will be identical to theborder node's receive table, and the intra-LAN TARP node's receive tablewill be identical to the border node's transmit table.

The algorithm used for IP address-hopping can be any desired algorithm.For example, the algorithm can be a given pseudo-random number generatorthat generates numbers of the range covering the allowed IP addresseswith a given seed. Alternatively, the session participants can assume acertain type of algorithm and specify simply a parameter for applyingthe algorithm. For example the assumed algorithm could be a particularpseudo-random number generator and the session participants could simplyexchange seed values.

Note that there is no permanent physical distinction between theoriginating and destination terminal nodes. Either device at either endpoint can initiate a synchronization of the pair. Note also that theauthentication/synchronization-request (and acknowledgment) andhopblock-exchange may all be served by a single message so that separatemessage exchanges may not be required.

As another extension to the stated architecture, multiple physical pathscan be used by a client, in order to provide link redundancy and furtherthwart attempts at denial of service and traffic monitoring. As shown inFIG. 10, for example, client 1001 can establish three simultaneoussessions with each of three TARP routers provided by different ISPs1011, 1012, 1013. As an example, the client 1001 can use three differenttelephone lines 1021, 1022, 1023 to connect to the ISPs, or twotelephone lines and a cable modem, etc. In this scheme, transmittedpackets will be sent in a random fashion among the different physicalpaths. This architecture provides a high degree of communicationsredundancy, with improved immunity from denial-of- service attacks andtraffic monitoring.

2. Further Extensions

The following describes various extensions to the techniques, systems,and methods described above. As described above, the security ofcommunications occurring between computers in a computer network (suchas the Internet, an Ethernet, or others) can be enhanced by usingseemingly random source and destination Internet Protocol (IP) addressesfor data packets transmitted over the network. This feature preventseavesdroppers from determining which computers in the network arecommunicating with each other while permitting the two communicatingcomputers to easily recognize whether a given received data packet islegitimate or not. In one embodiment of the above-described systems, anIP header extension field is used to authenticate incoming packets on anEthernet.

Various extensions to the previously described techniques describedherein include: (1) use of hopped hardware or “MAC” addresses inbroadcast type network; (2) a self synchronization technique thatpermits a computer to automatically regain synchronization with asender; (3) synchronization algorithms that allow transmitting andreceiving computers to quickly re-establish synchronization in the eventof lost packets or other events; and (4) a fast-packet rejectionmechanism for rejecting invalid packets. Any or all of these extensionscan be combined with the features described above in any of variousways.

A. Hardware Address Hopping

Internet protocol-based communications techniques on a LAN—or across anydedicated physical medium—typically embed the IP packets withinlower-level packets, often referred to as “frames.” As shown in FIG. 11,for example, a first Ethernet frame 1150 comprises a frame header 1101and two embedded IP packets IP1 and IP2, while a second Ethernet frame1160 comprises a different frame header 1104 and a single IP packet IP3.Each frame header generally includes a source hardware address 1101 Aand a destination hardware address 1101 B; other well-known fields inframe headers are omitted from FIG. 11 for clarity. Two hardware nodescommunicating over a physical communication channel insert appropriatesource and destination hardware addresses to indicate which nodes on thechannel or network should receive the frame.

It may be possible for a nefarious listener to acquire information aboutthe contents of a frame and/or its communicants by examining frames on alocal network rather than (or in addition to) the IP packets themselves.This is especially true in broadcast media, such as Ethernet, where itis necessary to insert into the frame header the hardware address of themachine that generated the frame and the hardware address of the machineto which frame is being sent. All nodes on the network can potentially“see” all packets transmitted across the network. This can be a problemfor secure communications, especially in cases where the communicants donot want for any third party to be able to identify who is engaging inthe information exchange. One way to address this problem is to push theaddress-hopping scheme down to the hardware layer. In accordance withvarious embodiments of the invention, hardware addresses are “hopped” ina manner similar to that used to change IP addresses, such that alistener cannot determine which hardware node generated a particularmessage nor which node is the intended recipient.

FIG. 12A shows a system in which Media Access Control (“MAC”) hardwareaddresses are “hopped” in order to increase security over a network suchas an Ethernet. While the description refers to the exemplary case of anEthernet environment, the inventive principles are equally applicable toother types of communications media. In the Ethernet case, the MACaddress of the sender and receiver are inserted into the Ethernet frameand can be observed by anyone on the LAN who is within the broadcastrange for that frame. For secure communications, it becomes desirable togenerate frames with MAC addresses that are not attributable to anyspecific sender or receiver.

As shown in FIG. 12A, two computer nodes 1201 and 1202 communicate overa communication channel such as an Ethernet. Each node executes one ormore application programs 1203 and 1218 that communicate by transmittingpackets through communication software 1204 and 1217, respectively.Examples of application programs include video conferencing, e-mail,word processing programs, telephony, and the like. Communicationsoftware 1204 and 1217 can comprise, for example, an OSI layeredarchitecture or “stack” that standardizes various services provided atdifferent levels of functionality.

The lowest levels of communication software 1204 and 1217 communicatewith hardware components 1206 and 1214 respectively, each of which caninclude one or more registers 1207 and 1215 that allow the hardware tobe reconfigured or controlled in accordance with various communicationprotocols. The hardware components (an Ethernet network interface card,for example) communicate with each other over the communication medium.Each hardware component is typically pre-assigned a fixed hardwareaddress or MAC number that identifies the hardware component to othernodes on the network. One or more interface drivers control theoperation of each card and can, for example, be configured to accept orreject packets from certain hardware addresses. As will be described inmore detail below, various embodiments of the inventive principlesprovide for “hopping” different addresses using one or more algorithmsand one or more moving windows that track a range of valid addresses tovalidate received packets. Packets transmitted according to one or moreof the inventive principles will be generally referred to as “secure”packets or “secure communications” to differentiate them from ordinarydata packets that are transmitted in the clear using ordinary,machine-correlated addresses.

One straightforward method of generating non-attributable MAC addressesis an extension of the IP hopping scheme. In this scenario, two machineson the same LAN that desire to communicate in a secure fashion exchangerandom-number generators and seeds, and create sequences of quasi-randomMAC addresses for synchronized hopping. The implementation andsynchronization issues are then similar to that of IP hopping.

This approach, however, runs the risk of using MAC addresses that arecurrently active on the LAN—which, in turn, could interruptcommunications for those machines. Since an Ethernet MAC address is atpresent 48 bits in length, the chance of randomly misusing an active MACaddress is actually quite small. However, if that figure is multipliedby a large number of nodes (as would be found on an extensive LAN), by alarge number of frames (as might be the case with packet voice orstreaming video), and by a large number of concurrent Virtual PrivateNetworks (VPNs), then the chance that a non-secure machine's MAC addresscould be used in an address-hopped frame can become non-trivial. Inshort, any scheme that runs even a small risk of interruptingcommunications for other machines on the LAN is bound to receiveresistance from prospective system administrators. Nevertheless, it istechnically feasible, and can be implemented without risk on a LAN onwhich there is a small number of machines, or if all of the machines onthe LAN are engaging in MAC-hopped communications.

Synchronized MAC address hopping may incur some overhead in the courseof session establishment, especially if there are multiple sessions ormultiple nodes involved in the communications. A simpler method ofrandomizing MAC addresses is to allow each node to receive and processevery incident frame on the network. Typically, each network interfacedriver will check the destination MAC address in the header of everyincident frame to see if it matches that machine's MAC address; if thereis no match, then the frame is discarded. In one embodiment, however,these checks can be disabled, and every incident packet is passed to theTARP stack for processing. This will be referred to as “promiscuous”mode, since every incident frame is processed. Promiscuous mode allowsthe sender to use completely random, unsynchronized MAC addresses, sincethe destination machine is guaranteed to process the frame. The decisionas to whether the packet was truly intended for that machine is handledby the TARP stack, which checks the source and destination IP addressesfor a match in its IP synchronization tables. If no match is found, thepacket is discarded; if there is a match, the packet is unwrapped, theinner header is evaluated, and if the inner header indicates that thepacket is destined for that machine then the packet is forwarded to theIP stack—otherwise it is discarded.

One disadvantage of purely-random MAC address hopping is its impact onprocessing overhead; that is, since every incident frame must beprocessed, the machine's CPU is engaged considerably more often than ifthe network interface driver is discriminating and rejecting packetsunilaterally. A compromise approach is to select either a single fixedMAC address or a small number of MAC addresses (e.g., one for eachvirtual private network on an Ethernet) to use for MAC-hoppedcommunications, regardless of the actual recipient for which the messageis intended. In this mode, the network interface driver can check eachincident frame against one (or a few) pre-established MAC addresses,thereby freeing the CPU from the task of physical- layer packetdiscrimination. This scheme does not betray any useful information to aninterloper on the LAN; in particular, every secure packet can already beidentified by a unique packet type in the outer header. However, sinceall machines engaged in secure communications would either be using thesame MAC address, or be selecting from a small pool of predetermined MACaddresses, the association between a specific machine and a specific MACaddress is effectively broken.

In this scheme, the CPU will be engaged more often than it would be innon-secure communications (or in synchronized MAC address hopping),since the network interface driver cannot always unilaterallydiscriminate between secure packets that are destined for that machine,and secure packets from other VPNs. However, the non-secure traffic iseasily eliminated at the network interface, thereby reducing the amountof processing required of the CPU. There are boundary conditions wherethese statements would not hold, of course—e.g., if all of the trafficon the LAN is secure traffic, then the CPU would be engaged to the samedegree as it is in the purely-random address hopping case;alternatively, if each VPN on the LAN uses a different MAC address, thenthe network interface can perfectly discriminate secure frames destinedfor the local machine from those constituting other VPNs. These areengineering tradeoffs that might be best handled by providingadministrative options for the users when installing the software and/orestablishing VPNs.

Even in this scenario, however, there still remains a slight risk ofselecting MAC addresses that are being used by one or more nodes on theLAN. One solution to this problem is to formally assign one address or arange of addresses for use in MAC-hopped communications. This istypically done via an assigned numbers registration authority; e.g., inthe case of Ethernet, MAC address ranges are assigned to vendors by theInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE). Aformally-assigned range of addresses would ensure that secure frames donot conflict with any properly-configured and properly-functioningmachines on the LAN.

Reference will now be made to FIGS. 12A and 12B in order to describe themany combinations and features that follow the inventive principles. Asexplained above, two computer nodes 1201 and 1202 are assumed to becommunicating over a network or communication medium such as anEthernet. A communication protocol in each node (1204 and 1217,respectively) contains a modified element 1205 and 1216 that performscertain functions that deviate from the standard communicationprotocols. In particular, computer node 1201 implements a first “hop”algorithm 1208X that selects seemingly random source and destination IPaddresses (and, in one embodiment, seemingly random IP headerdiscriminator fields) in order to transmit each packet to the othercomputer node. For example, node 1201 maintains a transmit table 1208containing triplets of source (S), destination (D), and discriminatorfields (DS) that are inserted into outgoing IP packet headers. The tableis generated through the use of an appropriate algorithm (e.g., a randomnumber generator that is seeded with an appropriate seed) that is knownto the recipient node 1202. As each new IP packet is formed, the nextsequential entry out of the sender's transmit table 1208 is used topopulate the IP source, IP destination, and IP header extension field(e.g., discriminator field). It will be appreciated that the transmittable need not be created in advance but could instead be createdon-the-fly by executing the algorithm when each packet is formed.

At the receiving node 1202, the same IP hop algorithm 1222X ismaintained and used to generate a receive table 1222 that lists validtriplets of source IP address, destination IP address, and discriminatorfield. This is shown by virtue of the first five entries of transmittable 1208 matching the second five entries of receive table 1222. (Thetables may be slightly offset at any particular time due to lostpackets, misordered packets, or transmission delays). Additionally, node1202 maintains a receive window W3 that represents a list of valid IPsource, IP destination, and discriminator fields that will be acceptedwhen received as part of an incoming IP packet. As packets are received,window W3 slides down the list of valid entries, such that the possiblevalid entries change over time. Two packets that arrive out of order butare nevertheless matched to entries within window W3 will be accepted;those falling outside of window W3 will be rejected as invalid. Thelength of window W3 can be adjusted as necessary to reflect networkdelays or other factors.

Node 1202 maintains a similar transmit table 1221 for creating IPpackets and frames destined for node 1201 using a potentially differenthopping algorithm 1221 X, and node 1201 maintains a matching receivetable 1209 using the same algorithm 1209X. As node 1202 transmitspackets to node 1201 using seemingly random IP source, IP destination,and/or discriminator fields, node 1201 matches the incoming packetvalues to those falling within window WI maintained in its receivetable. In effect, transmit table 1208 of node 1201 is synchronized(i.e., entries are selected in the same order) to receive table 1222 ofreceiving node 1202. Similarly, transmit table 1221 of node 1202 issynchronized to receive table 1209 of node 1201. It will be appreciatedthat although a common algorithm is shown for the source, destinationand discriminator fields in FIG. 12A (using, e.g., a different seed foreach of the three fields), an entirely different algorithm could in factbe used to establish values for each of these fields. It will also beappreciated that one or two of the fields can be “hopped” rather thanall three as illustrated.

In accordance with another aspect of the invention, hardware or “MAC”addresses are hopped instead of or in addition to IP addresses and/orthe discriminator field in order to improve security in a local area orbroadcast-type network. To that end, node 1201 further maintains atransmit table 1210 using a transmit algorithm 1210X to generate sourceand destination hardware addresses that are inserted into frame headers(e.g., fields 1101A and 1101 B in FIG. 11) that are synchronized to acorresponding receive table 1224 at node 1202. Similarly, node 1202maintains a different transmit table 1223 containing source anddestination hardware addresses that is synchronized with a correspondingreceive table 1211 at node 1201. In this manner, outgoing hardwareframes appear to be originating from and going to completely randomnodes on the network, even though each recipient can determine whether agiven packet is intended for it or not. It will be appreciated that thehardware hopping feature can be implemented at a different level in thecommunications protocol than the IP hopping feature (e.g., in a carddriver or in a hardware card itself to improve performance).

FIG. 12B shows three different embodiments or modes that can be employedusing the aforementioned principles. In a first mode referred to as“promiscuous” mode, a common hardware address (e.g., a fixed address forsource and another for destination) or else a completely random hardwareaddress is used by all nodes on the network, such that a particularpacket cannot be attributed to any one node. Each node must initiallyaccept all packets containing the common (or random) hardware addressand inspect the IP addresses or discriminator field to determine whetherthe packet is intended for that node. In this regard, either the IPaddresses or the discriminator field or both can be varied in accordancewith an algorithm as described above. As explained previously, this mayincrease each node's overhead since additional processing is involved todetermine whether a given packet has valid source and destinationhardware addresses.

In a second mode referred to as “promiscuous per VPN” mode, a small setof fixed hardware addresses are used, with a fixed source/destinationhardware address used for all nodes communicating over a virtual privatenetwork. For example, if there are six nodes on an Ethernet, and thenetwork is to be split up into two private virtual networks such thatnodes on one VPN can communicate with only the other two nodes on itsown VPN, then two sets of hardware addresses could be used: one set forthe first VPN and a second set for the second VPN. This would reduce theamount of overhead involved in checking for valid frames since onlypackets arriving from the designated VPN would need to be checked. IPaddresses and one or more discriminator fields could still be hopped asbefore for secure communication within the VPN. Of course, this solutioncompromises the anonymity of the VPNs (i.e., an outsider can easily tellwhat traffic belongs in which VPN, though he cannot correlate it to aspecific machine/person). It also requires the use of a discriminatorfield to mitigate the vulnerability to certain types of DoS attacks,(For example, without the discriminator field, an attacker on the LANcould stream frames containing the MAC addresses being used by the VPN;rejecting those frames could lead to excessive processing overhead. Thediscriminator field would provide a low-overhead means of rejecting thefalse packets.)

In a third mode referred to as “hardware hopping” mode, hardwareaddresses are varied as illustrated in FIG. 12A, such that hardwaresource and destination addresses are changed constantly in order toprovide non-attributable addressing. Variations on these embodiments areof course possible, and the invention is not intended to be limited inany respect by these illustrative examples.

B. Extending the Address Space

Address hopping provides security and privacy. However, the level ofprotection is limited by the number of addresses in the blocks beinghopped. A hopblock denotes a field or fields modulated on a packet-wisebasis for the purpose of providing a VPN. For instance, if two nodescommunicate with IP address hopping using hopblocks of 4 addresses (2bits) each, there would be 16 possible address-pair combinations. Awindow of size 16 would result in most address pairs being accepted asvalid most of the time. This limitation can be overcome by using adiscriminator field in addition to or instead of the hopped addressfields. The discriminator field would be hopped in exactly the samefashion as the address fields and it would be used to determine whethera packet should be processed by a receiver.

Suppose that two clients, each using four-bit hopblocks, would like thesame level of protection afforded to clients communicating via IPhopping between two A blocks (24 address bits eligible for hopping). Adiscriminator field of 20 bits, used in conjunction with the 4 addressbits eligible for hopping in the IP address field, provides this levelof protection. A 24-bit discriminator field would provide a similarlevel of protection if the address fields were not hopped or ignored.Using a discriminator field offers the following advantages: (1) anarbitrarily high level of protection can be provided, and (2) addresshopping is unnecessary to provide protection. This may be important inenvironments where address hopping would cause routing problems.

C. Synchronization Techniques

It is generally assumed that once a sending node and receiving node haveexchanged algorithms and seeds (or similar information sufficient togenerate quasi-random source and destination tables), subsequentcommunication between the two nodes will proceed smoothly.Realistically, however, two nodes may lose synchronization due tonetwork delays or outages, or other problems. Consequently, it isdesirable to provide means for re-establishing synchronization betweennodes in a network that have lost synchronization.

One possible technique is to require that each node provide anacknowledgment upon successful receipt of each packet and, if noacknowledgment is received within a certain period of time, to re-sendthe unacknowledged packet. This approach, however, drives up overheadcosts and may be prohibitive in high-throughput environments such asstreaming video or audio, for example.

A different approach is to employ an automatic synchronizing techniquethat will be referred to herein as “self-synchronization.” In thisapproach, synchronization information is embedded into each packet,thereby enabling the receiver to re-synchronize itself upon receipt of asingle packet if it determines that is has lost synchronization with thesender. (If communications are already in progress, and the receiverdetermines that it is still in sync with the sender, then there is noneed to re-synchronize.) A receiver could detect that it was out ofsynchronization by, for example, employing a “dead-man” timer thatexpires after a certain period of time, wherein the timer is reset witheach valid packet. A time stamp could be hashed into the public syncfield (see below) to preclude packet-retry attacks.

In one embodiment, a “sync field” is added to the header of each packetsent out by the sender. This sync field could appear in the clear or aspart of an encrypted portion of the packet. Assuming that a sender andreceiver have selected a random-number generator (RNG) and seed value,this combination of RNG and seed can be used to generate a random-numbersequence (RNS). The RNS is then used to generate a sequence ofsource/destination IP pairs (and, if desired, discriminator fields andhardware source and destination addresses), as described above. It isnot necessary, however, to generate the entire sequence (or the firstN-1 values) in order to generate the Nth random number in the sequence;if the sequence index N is known, the random value corresponding to thatindex can be directly generated (see below). Different RNGs (and seeds)with different fundamental periods could be used to generate the sourceand destination IP sequences, but the basic concepts would still apply.For the sake of simplicity, the following discussion will assume that IPsource and destination address pairs (only) are hopped using a singleRNG sequencing mechanism.

In accordance with a “self-synchronization” feature, a sync field ineach packet header provides an index (i.e., a sequence number) into theRNS that is being used to generate IP pairs. Plugging this index intothe RNG that is being used to generate the RNS yields a specific randomnumber value, which in turn yields a specific IP pair. That is, an IPpair can be generated directly from knowledge of the RNG, seed, andindex number; it is not necessary, in this scheme, to generate theentire sequence of random numbers that precede the sequence valueassociated with the index number provided.

Since the communicants have presumably previously exchanged RNGs andseeds, the only new information that must be provided in order togenerate an IP pair is the sequence number. If this number is providedby the sender in the packet header, then the receiver need only plugthis number into the RNG in order to generate an IP pair—and thus verifythat the IP pair appearing in the header of the packet is valid. In thisscheme, if the sender and receiver lose synchronization, the receivercan immediately re-synchronize upon receipt of a single packet by simplycomparing the IP pair in the packet header to the IP pair generated fromthe index number. Thus, synchronized communications can be resumed uponreceipt of a single packet, making this scheme ideal for multicastcommunications. Taken to the extreme, it could obviate the need forsynchronization tables entirely; that is, the sender and receiver couldsimply rely on the index number in the sync field to validate the IPpair on each packet, and thereby eliminate the tables entirely.

The aforementioned scheme may have some inherent security issuesassociated with it—namely, the placement of the sync field. If the fieldis placed in the outer header, then an interloper could observe thevalues of the field and their relationship to the IP stream. This couldpotentially compromise the algorithm that is being used to generate theIP-address sequence, which would compromise the security of thecommunications. If, however, the value is placed in the inner header,then the sender must decrypt the inner header before it can extract thesync value and validate the IP pair; this opens up the receiver tocertain types of denial-of-service (DoS) attacks, such as packet replay.That is, if the receiver must decrypt a packet before it can validatethe IP pair, then it could potentially be forced to expend a significantamount of processing on decryption if an attacker simply retransmitspreviously valid packets. Other attack methodologies are possible inthis scenario.

A possible compromise between algorithm security and processing speed isto split up the sync value between an inner (encrypted) and outer(unencrypted) header. That is, if the sync value is sufficiently long,it could potentially be split into a rapidly-changing part that can beviewed in the clear, and a fixed (or very slowly changing) part thatmust be protected. The part that can be viewed in the clear will becalled the “public sync” portion and the part that must be protectedwill be called the “private sync” portion.

Both the public sync and private sync portions are needed to generatethe complete sync value. The private portion, however, can be selectedsuch that it is fixed or will change only occasionally. Thus, theprivate sync value can be stored by the recipient, thereby obviating theneed to decrypt the header in order to retrieve it. If the sender andreceiver have previously agreed upon the frequency with which theprivate part of the sync will change, then the receiver can selectivelydecrypt a single header in order to extract the new private sync if thecommunications gap that has led to lost synchronization has exceeded thelifetime of the previous private sync. This should not represent aburdensome amount of decryption, and thus should not open up thereceiver to denial-of-service attack simply based on the need tooccasionally decrypt a single header.

One implementation of this is to use a hashing function with aone-to-one mapping to generate the private and public sync portions fromthe sync value. This implementation is shown in FIG. 13, where (forexample) a first ISP 1302 is the sender and a second ISP 1303 is thereceiver. (Other alternatives are possible from FIG. 13.) A transmittedpacket comprises a public or “outer” header 1305 that is not encrypted,and a private or “inner” header 1306 that is encrypted using for examplea link key. Outer header 1305 includes a public sync portion while innerheader 1306 contains the private sync portion. A receiving node decryptsthe inner header using a decryption function 1307 in order to extractthe private sync portion. This step is necessary only if the lifetime ofthe currently buffered private sync has expired. (If thecurrently-buffered private sync is still valid, then it is simplyextracted from memory and “added” (which could be an inverse hash) tothe public sync, as shown in step 1308.) The public and decryptedprivate sync portions are combined in function 1308 in order to generatethe combined sync 1309. The combined sync (1309) is then fed into theRNG (1310) and compared to the IP address pair (1311) to validate orreject the packet.

An important consideration in this architecture is the concept of“future” and “past” where the public sync values are concerned. Thoughthe sync values, themselves, should be random to prevent spoofingattacks, it may be important that the receiver be able to quicklyidentify a sync value that has already been sent—even if the packetcontaining that sync value was never actually received by the receiver.One solution is to hash a time stamp or sequence number into the publicsync portion, which could be quickly extracted, checked, and discarded,thereby validating the public sync portion itself.

In one embodiment, packets can be checked by comparing thesource/destination IP pair generated by the sync field with the pairappearing in the packet header. If (1) they match, (2) the time stamp isvalid, and (3) the dead-man timer has expired, then re-synchronizationoccurs; otherwise, the packet is rejected. If enough processing power isavailable, the dead-man timer and synchronization tables can be avoidedaltogether, and the receiver would simply resynchronize (e.g., validate)on every packet.

The foregoing scheme may require large-integer (e.g., 160-bit) math,which may affect its implementation. Without such large-integerregisters, processing throughput would be affected, thus potentiallyaffecting security from a denial-of-service standpoint. Nevertheless, aslarge integer math processing features become more prevalent, the costsof implementing such a feature will be reduced.

D. Other Synchronization Schemes

As explained above, if W or more consecutive packets are lost between atransmitter and receiver in a VPN (where W is the window size), thereceiver's window will not have been updated and the transmitter will betransmitting packets not in the receiver's window. The sender andreceiver will not recover synchronization until perhaps the random pairsin the window are repeated by chance. Therefore, there is a need to keepa transmitter and receiver in synchronization whenever possible and tore-establish synchronization whenever it is lost.

A “checkpoint” scheme can be used to regain synchronization between asender and a receiver that have fallen out of synchronization. In thisscheme, a checkpoint message comprising a random IP address pair is usedfor communicating synchronization information. In one embodiment, twomessages are used to communicate synchronization information between asender and a recipient:

-   -   1. SYNC_REQ is a message used by the sender to indicate that it        wants to synchronize; and    -   2. SYNC_ACK is a message used by the receiver to inform the        transmitter that it has been synchronized.

According to one variation of this approach, both the transmitter andreceiver maintain three checkpoints (see FIG. 14):

-   -   1. In the transmitter, ckpt_o (“checkpoint old”) is the IP pair        that was used to re-send the last SYNC_REQ packet to the        receiver. In the receiver, ckpt_o (“checkpoint old”) is the IP        pair that receives repeated SYNC REQ packets from the        transmitter.    -   2. In the transmitter, ckpt_n (“checkpoint new”) is the IP pair        that will be used to send the next SYNC_REQ packet to the        receiver. In the receiver, ckpt_n (“checkpoint new”) is the IP        pair that receives a new SYNC REQ packet from the transmitter        and which causes the receiver's window to be re-aligned, ckpt_o        set to ckpt_n, a new ckpt_n to be generated and a new ckpt_r to        be generated.    -   3. In the transmitter, ckpt_r is the IP pair that will be used        to send the next SYNC_ACK packet to the receiver. In the        receiver, ckpt_r is the IP pair that receives a new SYNC_ACK        packet from the transmitter and which causes a new ckpt_n to be        generated. Since SYNC_ACK is transmitted from the receiver ISP        to the sender ISP, the transmitter ckpt_r refers to the ckpt_r        of the receiver and the receiver ckpt_r refers to the ckpt_r of        the transmitter (see FIG. 14).        When a transmitter initiates synchronization, the IP pair it        will use to transmit the next data packet is set to a        predetermined value and when a receiver first receives a        SYNC_REQ, the receiver window is updated to be centered on the        transmitter's next IP pair. This is the primary mechanism for        checkpoint synchronization.

Synchronization can be initiated by a packet counter (e.g., after everyN packets transmitted, initiate a synchronization) or by a timer (everyS seconds, initiate a synchronization) or a combination of both. SeeFIG. 15. From the transmitter's perspective, this technique operates asfollows: (1) Each transmitter periodically transmits a “sync request”message to the receiver to make sure that it is in sync. (2) If thereceiver is still in sync, it sends back a “sync ack” message. (If thisworks, no further action is necessary). (3) If no “sync ack” has beenreceived within a period of time, the transmitter retransmits the syncrequest again. If the transmitter reaches the next checkpoint withoutreceiving a “sync ack” response, then synchronization is broken, and thetransmitter should stop transmitting. The transmitter will continue tosend sync_reqs until it receives a sync_ack, at which point transmissionis reestablished.

From the receiver's perspective, the scheme operates as follows: (1)when it receives a “sync request” request from the transmitter, itadvances its window to the next checkpoint position (even skipping pairsif necessary), and sends a “sync ack” message to the transmitter. Ifsync was never lost, then the “jump ahead” really just advances to thenext available pair of addresses in the table (i.e., normaladvancement).

If an interloper intercepts the “sync request” messages and tries tointerfere with communication by sending new ones, it will be ignored ifthe synchronization has been established or it will actually help tore-establish synchronization.

A window is realigned whenever a re-synchronization occurs. Thisrealignment entails updating the receiver's window to straddle theaddress pairs used by the packet transmitted immediately after thetransmission of the SYNC_REQ packet. Normally, the transmitter andreceiver are in synchronization with one another. However, when networkevents occur, the receiver's window may have to be advanced by manysteps during resynchronization. In this case, it is desirable to movethe window ahead without having to step through the intervening randomnumbers sequentially. (This feature is also desirable for the auto-syncapproach discussed above).

E. Random Number Generator with a Jump-Ahead capability

An attractive method for generating randomly hopped addresses is to useidentical random number generators in the transmitter and receiver andadvance them as packets are transmitted and received. There are manyrandom number generation algorithms that could be used. Each one hasstrengths and weaknesses for address hopping applications.

Linear congruential random number generators (LCRs) are fast, simple andwell characterized random number generators that can be made to jumpahead n steps efficiently. An LCR generates random numbers X₁, X₂, X₃ .. . Xk starting with seed X₀ using a recurrence

X _(i)=(a X _(i−1) +b) mod c,   (1)

where a, b and c define a particular LCR. Another expression for X_(i),

X _(i)=((a ^(i)(X ₀ +b)−b)/(a−1)) mod c   (2)

enables the jump-ahead capability. The factor a^(i) can grow very largeeven for modest i if left unfettered. Therefore some special propertiesof the modulo operation can be used to control the size and processingtime required to compute (2). (2) can be rewritten as:

X _(i)=(a ^(i)(X ₀(a−1)+b)−b)/(a−1) mod c.   (3)

It can be shown that:

(a ^(i)(X ₀(a−1)+b)−b)/(a−1) mod c=((a ^(i) mod((a−1)c)(X₀(a−1)+b)−b)/(a−1)) mod c   (4).

(X₀(a−1)+b) can be stored as (X₀(a−1)+b) mod c, b as b mod c and computea′ mod((a−1)c) (this requires O(log(i)) steps).

A practical implementation of this algorithm would jump a fixeddistance, n, between synchronizations; this is tantamount tosynchronizing every n packets. The window would commence n IP pairs fromthe start of the previous window. Using X_(j) ^(w), the random number atthe j^(th) checkpoint, as X₀ and n as i, a node can storea^(n)mod((a−1)c) once per LCR and set

X _(j+1) ^(w) =X _(n(j+1))=((a ^(n) mod((a−1)c) (X _(j)^(w)(a−1)+b)−b)/(a−1))mod c,   (5)

to generate the random number for the j+1^(th) synchronization. Usingthis construction, a node could jump ahead an arbitrary (but fixed)distance between synchronizations in a constant amount of time(independent of n).

Pseudo-random number generators, in general, and LCRs, in particular,will eventually repeat their cycles. This repetition may presentvulnerability in the IP hopping scheme. An adversary would simply haveto wait for a repeat to predict future sequences. One way of coping withthis vulnerability is to create a random number generator with a knownlong cycle. A random sequence can be replaced by a new random numbergenerator before it repeats. LCRs can be constructed with known longcycles. This is not currently true of many random number generators.

Random number generators can be cryptographically insecure. An adversarycan derive the RNG parameters by examining the output or part of theoutput. This is true of LCGs. This vulnerability can be mitigated byincorporating an encryptor, designed to scramble the output as part ofthe random number generator. The random number generator prevents anadversary from mounting an attack—e.g., a known plaintext attack—againstthe encryptor.

F. Random Number Generator Example

Consider a RNG where a=31,b=4 and c=15. For this case equation (1)becomes:

X _(i)=(31 X _(i−1)+4) mod 15.   (6)

If one sets X₀=1, equation (6) will produce the sequence 1, 5, 9, 13, 2,6, 10, 14, 3, 7, 11, 0, 4, 8, 12. This sequence will repeatindefinitely. For a jump ahead of 3 numbers in this sequencea^(n)=31³=29791, c*(a−1)=15*30=450 and a^(n)mod((a−1)c)=31³mod(15*30)=29791mod(450)=91. Equation (5) becomes:

((91 (X _(i)30+4)−4)/30)mod 15   (7).

Table 1 shows the jump ahead calculations from (7). The calculationsstart at 5 and jump ahead 3.

TABLE 1 I X_(i) (X_(i)30 + 4) 91 (X_(i)30 + 4) − 4 ((91 (X_(i)30 + 4) −4)/30 X_(i+3) 1 5 154 14010 467 2 4 2 64 5820 194 14 7 14 424 38580 128611 10 11 334 30390 1013 8 13 8 244 22200 740 5

G. Fast Packet Filter

Address hopping VPNs must rapidly determine whether a packet has a validheader and thus requires further processing, or has an invalid header (ahostile packet) and should be immediately rejected. Such rapiddeterminations will be referred to as “fast packet filtering.” Thiscapability protects the VPN from attacks by an adversary who streamshostile packets at the receiver at a high rate of speed in the hope ofsaturating the receiver's processor (a so-called “denial of service”attack). Fast packet filtering is an important feature for implementingVPNs on shared media such as Ethernet.

Assuming that all participants in a VPN share an unassigned “A” block ofaddresses, one possibility is to use an experimental “A” block that willnever be assigned to any machine that is not address hopping on theshared medium. “A” blocks have a 24 bits of address that can be hoppedas opposed to the 8 bits in “C” blocks. In this case a hopblock will bethe “A” block. The use of the experimental “A” block is a likely optionon an Ethernet because:

-   -   1. The addresses have no validity outside of the Ethernet and        will not be routed out to a valid outside destination by a        gateway.    -   2. There are 2²⁴ (˜16 million) addresses that can be hopped        within each “A” block. This yields >280 trillion possible        address pairs making it very unlikely that an adversary would        guess a valid address. It also provides acceptably low        probability of collision between separate VPNs (all VPNs on a        shared medium independently generate random address pairs from        the same “A” block).    -   3. The packets will not be received by someone on the Ethernet        who is not on a VPN (unless the machine is in promiscuous mode)        minimizing impact on non-VPN computers.

The Ethernet example will be used to describe one implementation of fastpacket filtering. The ideal algorithm would quickly examine a packetheader, determine whether the packet is hostile, and reject any hostilepackets or determine which active IP pair the packet header matches. Theproblem is a classical associative memory problem. A variety oftechniques have been developed to solve this problem (hashing, B—treesetc). Each of these approaches has its strengths and weaknesses. Forinstance, hash tables can be made to operate quite fast in a statisticalsense, but can occasionally degenerate into a much slower algorithm.This slowness can persist for a period of time. Since there is a need todiscard hostile packets quickly at all times, hashing would beunacceptable.

H. Presence Vector Algorithm

A presence vector is a bit vector of length 2^(n) that can be indexed byn-bit numbers (each ranging from 0 to 2^(n)−1). One can indicate thepresence of k n-bit numbers (not necessarily unique), by setting thebits in the presence vector indexed by each number to 1. Otherwise, thebits in the presence vector are 0. An n-bit number, x, is one of the knumbers if and only if the x^(th) bit of the presence vector is 1. Afast packet filter can be implemented by indexing the presence vectorand looking for a 1, which will be referred to as the “test.”

For example, suppose one wanted to represent the number 135 using apresence vector. The 135^(th) bit of the vector would be set.Consequently, one could very quickly determine whether an address of 135was valid by checking only one bit: the 135^(th) bit. The presencevectors could be created in advance corresponding to the table entriesfor the IP addresses. In effect, the incoming addresses can be used asindices into a long vector, making comparisons very fast. As each RNGgenerates a new address, the presence vector is updated to reflect theinformation. As the window moves, the presence vector is updated to zeroout addresses that are no longer valid.

There is a trade-off between efficiency of the test and the amount ofmemory required for storing the presence vector(s). For instance, if onewere to use the 48 bits of hopping addresses as an index, the presencevector would have to be 35 terabytes. Clearly, this is too large forpractical purposes. Instead, the 48 bits can be divided into severalsmaller fields. For instance, one could subdivide the 48 bits into four12-bit fields (see FIG. 16). This reduces the storage requirement to2048 bytes at the expense of occasionally having to process a hostilepacket. In effect, instead of one long presence vector, the decomposedaddress portions must match all four shorter presence vectors beforefurther processing is allowed. (If the first part of the address portiondoesn't match the first presence vector, there is no need to check theremaining three presence vectors).

A presence vector will have a 1 in the y^(th) bit if and only if one ormore addresses with a corresponding field of y are active. An address isactive only if each presence vector indexed by the appropriate sub-fieldof the address is 1.

Consider a window of 32 active addresses and 3 checkpoints. A hostilepacket will be rejected by the indexing of one presence vector more than99% of the time. A hostile packet will be rejected by the indexing ofall 4 presence vectors more than 99.9999995% of the time. On average,hostile packets will be rejected in less than 1.02 presence vector indexoperations.

The small percentage of hostile packets that pass the fast packet filterwill be rejected when matching pairs are not found in the active windowor are active checkpoints. Hostile packets that serendipitously match aheader will be rejected when the VPN software attempts to decrypt theheader. However, these cases will be extremely rare. There are manyother ways this method can be configured to arbitrate the space/speedtradeoffs.

I. Further Synchronization Enhancements

A slightly modified form of the synchronization techniques describedabove can be employed. The basic principles of the previously describedcheckpoint synchronization scheme remain unchanged. The actionsresulting from the reception of the checkpoints are, however, slightlydifferent. In this variation, the receiver will maintain between OoO(“Out of Order”) and 2xWINDOW_SIZE+OoO active addresses(1≦OoO≦WINDOW_SIZE and WINDOW_SIZE≧1). OoO and WINDOW_SIZE areengineerable parameters, where OoO is the minimum number of addressesneeded to accommodate lost packets due to events in the network or outof order arrivals and WINDOW_SIZE is the number of packets transmittedbefore a SYNC_REQ is issued. FIG. 17 depicts a storage array for areceiver's active addresses.

The receiver starts with the first 2xWINDOW_SIZE addresses loaded andactive (ready to receive data). As packets are received, thecorresponding entries are marked as “used” and are no longer eligible toreceive packets. The transmitter maintains a packet counter, initiallyset to 0, containing the number of data packets transmitted since thelast initial transmission of a SYNC_REQ for which SYNC_ACK has beenreceived. When the transmitter packet counter equals WINDOW_SIZE, thetransmitter generates a SYNC_REQ and does its initial transmission. Whenthe receiver receives a SYNC_REQ corresponding to its current CKPT_N, itgenerates the next WINDOW_SIZE addresses and starts loading them inorder starting at the first location after the last active addresswrapping around to the beginning of the array after the end of the arrayhas been reached. The receiver's array might look like FIG. 18 when aSYNC_REQ has been received. In this case a couple of packets have beeneither lost or will be received out of order when the SYNC_REQ isreceived.

FIG. 19 shows the receiver's array after the new addresses have beengenerated. If the transmitter does not receive a SYNC_ACK, it willre-issue the SYNC_REQ at regular intervals. When the transmitterreceives a SYNC_ACK, the packet counter is decremented by WINDOW_SIZE.If the packet counter reaches 2xWINDOW_SIZE—OoO then the transmitterceases sending data packets until the appropriate SYNC_ACK is finallyreceived. The transmitter then resumes sending data packets. Futurebehavior is essentially a repetition of this initial cycle. Theadvantages of this approach are:

-   -   1. There is no need for an efficient jump ahead in the random        number generator,    -   2. No packet is ever transmitted that does not have a        corresponding entry in the receiver side    -   3. No timer based re-synchronization is necessary. This is a        consequence of 2.    -   4. The receiver will always have the ability to accept data        messages transmitted within OoO messages of the most recently        transmitted message.

J. Distributed Transmission Path Variant

Another embodiment incorporating various inventive principles is shownin FIG. 20. In this embodiment, a message transmission system includes afirst computer 2001 in communication with a second computer 2002 througha network 2011 of intermediary computers. In one variant of thisembodiment, the network includes two edge routers 2003 and 2004 each ofwhich is linked to a plurality of Internet Service Providers (ISPs) 2005through 2010. Each ISP is coupled to a plurality of other ISPs in anarrangement as shown in FIG. 20, which is a representative configurationonly and is not intended to be limiting. Each connection between ISPs islabeled in FIG. 20 to indicate a specific physical transmission path(e.g., AD is a physical path that links ISP A (element 2005) to ISP D(element 2008)). Packets arriving at each edge router are selectivelytransmitted to one of the ISPs to which the router is attached on thebasis of a randomly or quasi-randomly selected basis.

As shown in FIG. 21, computer 2001 or edge router 2003 incorporates aplurality of link transmission tables 2100 that identify, for eachpotential transmission path through the network, valid sets of IPaddresses that can be used to transmit the packet. For example, AD table2101 contains a plurality of IP source/destination pairs that arerandomly or quasi-randomly generated. When a packet is to be transmittedfrom first computer 2001 to second computer 2002, one of the link tablesis randomly (or quasi-randomly) selected, and the next validsource/destination address pair from that table is used to transmit thepacket through the network. If path AD is randomly selected, forexample, the next source/destination IP address pair (which ispre-determined to transmit between ISP A (element 2005) and ISP B(element 2008)) is used to transmit the packet. If one of thetransmission paths becomes degraded or inoperative, that link table canbe set to a “down” condition as shown in table 2105, thus preventingaddresses from being selected from that table. Other transmission pathswould be unaffected by this broken link.

3. Continuation-In-Part Improvements

The following describes various improvements and features that can beapplied to the embodiments described above. The improvements include:(1) a load balancer that distributes packets across differenttransmission paths according to transmission path quality; (2) a DNSproxy server that transparently creates a virtual private network inresponse to a domain name inquiry; (3) a large-to-small link bandwidthmanagement feature that prevents denial-of-service attacks at systemchokepoints; (4) a traffic limiter that regulates incoming packets bylimiting the rate at which a transmitter can be synchronized with areceiver; and (5) a signaling synchronizer that allows a large number ofnodes to communicate with a central node by partitioning thecommunication function between two separate entities. Each is discussedseparately below.

A. Load Balancer

Various embodiments described above include a system in which atransmitting node and a receiving node are coupled through a pluralityof transmission paths, and wherein successive packets are distributedquasi-randomly over the plurality of paths. See, for example, FIGS. 20and 21 and accompanying description. The improvement extends this basicconcept to encompass distributing packets across different paths in sucha manner that the loads on the paths are generally balanced according totransmission link quality.

In one embodiment, a system includes a transmitting node and a receivingnode that are linked via a plurality of transmission paths havingpotentially varying transmission quality. Successive packets aretransmitted over the paths based on a weight value distribution functionfor each path. The rate that packets will be transmitted over a givenpath can be different for each path. The relative “health” of eachtransmission path is monitored in order to identify paths that havebecome degraded. In one embodiment, the health of each path is monitoredin the transmitter by comparing the number of packets transmitted to thenumber of packet acknowledgements received. Each transmission path maycomprise a physically separate path (e.g., via dial-up phone line,computer network, router, bridge, or the like), or may compriselogically separate paths contained within a broadband communicationmedium (e.g., separate channels in an FDM, TDM, CDMA, or other type ofmodulated or unmodulated transmission link).

When the transmission quality of a path falls below a predeterminedthreshold and there are other paths that can transmit packets, thetransmitter changes the weight value used for that path, making it lesslikely that a given packet will be transmitted over that path. Theweight will preferably be set no lower than a minimum value that keepsnominal traffic on the path. The weights of the other available pathsare altered to compensate for the change in the affected path. When thequality of a path degrades to where the transmitter is turned off by thesynchronization function (i.e., no packets are arriving at thedestination), the weight is set to zero. If all transmitters are turnedoff, no packets are sent.

Conventional TCP/IP protocols include a “throttling” feature thatreduces the transmission rate of packets when it is determined thatdelays or errors are occurring in transmission. In this respect, timersare sometimes used to determine whether packets have been received.These conventional techniques for limiting transmission of packets,however, do not involve multiple transmission paths between two nodeswherein transmission across a particular path relative to the others ischanged based on link quality.

According to certain embodiments, in order to damp oscillations thatmight otherwise occur if weight distributions are changed drastically(e.g., according to a step function), a linear or an exponential decayformula can be applied to gradually decrease the weight value over timethat a degrading path will be used. Similarly, if the health of adegraded path improves, the weight value for that path is graduallyincreased.

Transmission link health can be evaluated by comparing the number ofpackets that are acknowledged within the transmission window (seeembodiments discussed above) to the number of packets transmitted withinthat window and by the state of the transmitter (i.e., on or off). Inother words, rather than accumulating general transmission statisticsover time for a path, one specific implementation uses the “windowing”concepts described above to evaluate transmission path health.

The same scheme can be used to shift virtual circuit paths from an“unhealthy” path to a “healthy” one, and to select a path for a newvirtual circuit.

FIG. 22A shows a flowchart for adjusting weight values associated with aplurality of transmission links. It is assumed that software executingin one or more computer nodes executes the steps shown in FIG. 22A. Itis also assumed that the software can be stored on a computer-readablemedium such as a magnetic or optical disk for execution by a computer.

Beginning in step 2201, the transmission quality of a given transmissionpath is measured. As described above, this measurement can be based on acomparison between the number of packets transmitted over a particularlink to the number of packet acknowledgements received over the link(e.g., per unit time, or in absolute terms). Alternatively, the qualitycan be evaluated by comparing the number of packets that areacknowledged within the transmission window to the number of packetsthat were transmitted within that window. In yet another variation, thenumber of missed synchronization messages can be used to indicate linkquality. Many other variations are of course possible.

In step 2202, a check is made to determine whether more than onetransmitter (e.g., transmission path) is turned on. If not, the processis terminated and resumes at step 2201.

In step 2203, the link quality is compared to a given threshold (e.g.,50%, or any arbitrary number). If the quality falls below the threshold,then in step 2207 a check is made to determine whether the weight isabove a minimum level (e.g., 1%). If not, then in step 2209 the weightis set to the minimum level and processing resumes at step 2201. If theweight is above the minimum level, then in step 2208 the weight isgradually decreased for the path, then in step 2206 the weights for theremaining paths are adjusted accordingly to compensate (e.g., they areincreased).

If in step 2203 the quality of the path was greater than or equal to thethreshold, then in step 2204 a check is made to determine whether theweight is less than a steady-state value for that path. If so, then instep 2205 the weight is increased toward the steady-state value, and instep 2206 the weights for the remaining paths are adjusted accordinglyto compensate (e.g., they are decreased). If in step 2204 the weight isnot less than the steady-state value, then processing resumes at step2201 without adjusting the weights.

The weights can be adjusted incrementally according to variousfunctions, preferably by changing the value gradually. In oneembodiment, a linearly decreasing function is used to adjust theweights; according to another embodiment, an exponential decay functionis used. Gradually changing the weights helps to damp oscillators thatmight otherwise occur if the probabilities were abruptly.

Although not explicitly shown in FIG. 22A the process can be performedonly periodically (e.g., according to a time schedule), or it can becontinuously run, such as in a background mode of operation. In oneembodiment, the combined weights of all potential paths should add up tounity (e.g., when the weighting for one path is decreased, thecorresponding weights that the other paths will be selected willincrease).

Adjustments to weight values for other paths can be prorated. Forexample, a decrease of 10% in weight value for one path could result inan evenly distributed increase in the weights for the remaining paths.Alternatively, weightings could be adjusted according to a weightedformula as desired (e.g., favoring healthy paths over less healthypaths). In yet another variation, the difference in weight value can beamortized over the remaining links in a manner that is proportional totheir traffic weighting.

FIG. 22B shows steps that can be executed to shut down transmissionlinks where a transmitter turns off. In step 2210, a transmittershut-down event occurs. In step 2211, a test is made to determinewhether at least one transmitter is still turned on. If not, then instep 2215 all packets are dropped until a transmitter turns on. If instep 2211 at least one transmitter is turned on, then in step 2212 theweight for the path is set to zero, and the weights for the remainingpaths are adjusted accordingly.

FIG. 23 shows a computer node 2301 employing various principles of theabove-described embodiments. It is assumed that two computer nodes ofthe type shown in FIG. 23 communicate over a plurality of separatephysical transmission paths. As shown in FIG. 23, four transmissionpaths X1 through X4 are defined for communicating between the two nodes.Each node includes a packet transmitter 2302 that operates in accordancewith a transmit table 2308 as described above. (The packet transmittercould also operate without using the IP-hopping features describedabove, but the following description assumes that some form of hoppingis employed in conjunction with the path selection mechanism.). Thecomputer node also includes a packet receiver 2303 that operates inaccordance with a receive table 2309, including a moving window W thatmoves as valid packets are received. Invalid packets having source anddestination addresses that do not fall within window W are rejected.

As each packet is readied for transmission, source and destination IPaddresses (or other discriminator values) are selected from transmittable 2308 according to any of the various algorithms described above,and packets containing these source/destination address pairs, whichcorrespond to the node to which the four transmission paths are linked,are generated to a transmission path switch 2307. Switch 2307, which cancomprise a software function, selects from one of the availabletransmission paths according to a weight distribution table 2306. Forexample, if the weight for path X1 is 0.2, then every fifth packet willbe transmitted on path X1. A similar regime holds true for the otherpaths as shown. Initially, each link's weight value can be set such thatit is proportional to its bandwidth, which will be referred to as its“steady-state” value.

Packet receiver 2303 generates an output to a link quality measurementfunction 2304 that operates as described above to determine the qualityof each transmission path. (The input to packet receiver 2303 forreceiving incoming packets is omitted for clarity). Link qualitymeasurement function 2304 compares the link quality to a threshold foreach transmission link and, if necessary, generates an output to weightadjustment function 2305. If a weight adjustment is required, then theweights in table 2306 are adjusted accordingly, preferably according toa gradual (e.g., linearly or exponentially declining) function. In oneembodiment, the weight values for all available paths are initially setto the same value, and only when paths degrade in quality are theweights changed to reflect differences.

Link quality measurement function 2304 can be made to operate as part ofa synchronizer function as described above. That is, ifresynchronization occurs and the receiver detects that synchronizationhas been lost (e.g., resulting in the synchronization window W beingadvanced out of sequence), that fact can be used to drive link qualitymeasurement function 2304. According to one embodiment, load balancingis performed using information garnered during the normalsynchronization, augmented slightly to communicate link health from thereceiver to the transmitter. The receiver maintains a count, MESS_R(W),of the messages received in synchronization window W. When it receives asynchronization request (SYNC_REQ) corresponding to the end of window W,the receiver includes counter MESS_R in the resulting synchronizationacknowledgement (SYNC_ACK) sent back to the transmitter. This allows thetransmitter to compare messages sent to messages received in order toasses—the health of the link.

If synchronization is completely lost, weight adjustment function 2305decreases the weight value on the affected path to zero. Whensynchronization is regained, the weight value for the affected path isgradually increased to its original value. Alternatively, link qualitycan be measured by evaluating the length of time required for thereceiver to acknowledge a synchronization request. In one embodiment,separate transmit and receive tables are used for each transmissionpath.

When the transmitter receives a SYNC_ACK, the MESS_R is compared withthe number of messages transmitted in a window (MESS_T). When thetransmitter receives a SYNC_ACK, the traffic probabilities will beexamined and adjusted if necessary. MESS_R is compared with the numberof messages transmitted in a window (MESS_T). There are twopossibilities:

1. If MESS_R is less than a threshold value, THRESH, then the link willbe deemed to be unhealthy. If the transmitter was turned off, thetransmitter is turned on and the weight P for that link will be set to aminimum value MIN. This will keep a trickle of traffic on the link formonitoring purposes until it recovers. If the transmitter was turned on,the weight P for that link will be set to:

P′=αx MIN+(1−α)xP   (1)

Equation 1 will exponentially damp the traffic weight value to MINduring sustained periods of degraded service.

2. If MESS_R for a link is greater than or equal to THRESH, the linkwill be deemed healthy. If the weight P for that link is greater than orequal to the steady state value S for that link, then P is leftunaltered. If the weight P for that link is less than THRESH then P willbe set to:

P′=βx S+(1−β)xP   (2)

where β is a parameter such that 0<=β<=1 that determines the dampingrate of P.

Equation 2 will increase the traffic weight to S during sustainedperiods of acceptable service in a damped exponential fashion.

A detailed example will now be provided with reference to FIG. 24. Asshown in FIG. 24, a first computer 2401 communicates with a secondcomputer 2402 through two routers 2403 and 2404. Each router is coupledto the other router through three transmission links. As describedabove, these may be physically diverse links or logical links (includingvirtual private networks).

Suppose that a first link L1 can sustain a transmission bandwidth of 100Mb/s and has a window size of 32; link L2 can sustain 75 Mb/s and has awindow size of 24; and link L3 can sustain 25 Mb/s and has a window sizeof 8. The combined links can thus sustain 200 Mb/s. The steady statetraffic weights are 0.5 for link L1; 0.375 for link L2, and 0.125 forlink L3. MIN=1 Mb/s, THRESH=0.8 MESS_T for each link, α=0.75 and β=0.5.These traffic weights will remain stable until a link stops forsynchronization or reports a number of packets received less than itsTHRESH. Consider the following sequence of events:

-   -   1. Link L1 receives a SYNC_ACK containing a MESS_R of 24,        indicating that only 75% of the MESS_T (32) messages transmitted        in the last window were successfully received. Link 1 would be        below THRESH (0.8). Consequently, link L1's traffic weight value        would be reduced to 0.12825, while link L2's traffic weight        value would be increased to 0.65812 and link L3's traffic weight        value would be increased to 0.217938.    -   2. Link L2 and L3 remained healthy and link L1 stopped to        synchronize. Then link L1's traffic weight value would be set to        0, link L2's traffic weight value would be set to 0.75, and link        L33's traffic weight value would be set to 0.25.    -   3. Link L1 finally received a SYNC_ACK containing a MESS_R of 0        indicating that none of the MESS_T (32) messages transmitted in        the last window were successfully received. Link L1 would be        below THRESH. Link L1's traffic weight value would be increased        to 0.005, link L2's traffic weight value would be decreased to        0.74625, and link L3's traffic weight value would be decreased        to 0.24875.    -   4. Link L1 received a SYNC_ACK containing a MESS_R of 32        indicating that 100% of the MESS_T (32) messages transmitted in        the last window were successfully received. Link L1 would be        above THRESH. Link L1's traffic weight value would be increased        to 0.2525, while link L2's traffic weight value would be        decreased to 0.560625 and link L3's traffic weight value would        be decreased to 0.186875.    -   5. Link L1 received a SYNC_ACK containing a MESS_R of 32        indicating that 100% of the MESS_T (32) messages transmitted in        the last window were successfully received. Link L1 would be        above THRESH. Link L1's traffic weight value would be increased        to 0.37625; link L2's traffic weight value would be decreased to        0.4678125, and link L3's traffic weight value would be decreased        to 0.1559375.    -   6. Link L1 remains healthy and the traffic probabilities        approach their steady state traffic probabilities.

B. Use of a DNS Proxy to Transparently Create Virtual Private Networks

A second improvement concerns the automatic creation of a virtualprivate network (VPN) in response to a domain-name server look-upfunction.

Conventional Domain Name Servers (DNSs) provide a look-up function thatreturns the IP address of a requested computer or host. For example,when a computer user types in the web name “Yahoo.com,” the user's webbrowser transmits a request to a DNS, which converts the name into afour-part IP address that is returned to the user's browser and thenused by the browser to contact the destination web site.

This conventional scheme is shown in FIG. 25. A user's computer 2501includes a client application 2504 (for example, a web browser) and anIP protocol stack 2505. When the user enters the name of a destinationhost, a request DNS REQ is made (through IP protocol stack 2505) to aDNS 2502 to look up the IP address associated with the name. The DNSreturns the IP address DNS RESP to client application 2504, which isthen able to use the IP address to communicate with the host 2503through separate transactions such as PAGE REQ and PAGE RESP.

In the conventional architecture shown in FIG. 25, nefarious listenerson the Internet could intercept the DNS REQ and DNS RESP packets andthus learn what IP addresses the user was contacting. For example, if auser wanted to set up a secure communication path with a web site havingthe name “Target.com,” when the user's browser contacted a DNS to findthe IP address for that web site, the true IP address of that web sitewould be revealed over the Internet as part of the DNS inquiry. Thiswould hamper anonymous communications on the Internet.

One conventional scheme that provides secure virtual private networksover the Internet provides the DNS server with the public keys of themachines that the DNS server has the addresses for. This allows hosts toretrieve automatically the public keys of a host that the host is tocommunicate with so that the host can set up a VPN without having theuser enter the public key of the destination host. One implementation ofthis standard is presently being developed as part of the FreeS/WANproject(RFC 2535).

The conventional scheme suffers from certain drawbacks. For example, anyuser can perform a DNS request. Moreover, DNS requests resolve to thesame value for all users.

According to certain aspects of the invention, a specialized DNS servertraps DNS requests and, if the request is from a special type of user(e.g., one for which secure communication services are defined), theserver does not return the true IP address of the target node, butinstead automatically sets up a virtual private network between thetarget node and the user. The VPN is preferably implemented using the IPaddress “hopping” features of the basic invention described above, suchthat the true identity of the two nodes cannot be determined even ifpackets during the communication are intercepted. For DNS requests thatare determined to not require secure services (e.g., an unregistereduser), the DNS server transparently “passes through” the request toprovide a normal look-up function and return the IP address of thetarget web server, provided that the requesting host has permissions toresolve unsecured sites. Different users who make an identical DNSrequest could be provided with different results.

FIG. 26 shows a system employing various principles summarized above. Auser's computer 2601 includes a conventional client (e.g., a webbrowser) 2605 and an IP protocol stack 2606 that preferably operates inaccordance with an IP hopping function 2607 as outlined above. Amodified DNS server 2602 includes a conventional DNS server function2609 and a DNS proxy 2610. A gatekeeper server 2603 is interposedbetween the modified DNS server and a secure target site 2704. An“unsecure” target site 2611 is also accessible via conventional IPprotocols.

According to one embodiment, DNS proxy 2610 intercepts all DNS lookupfunctions from client 2605 and determines whether access to a securesite has been requested. If access to a secure site has been requested(as determined, for example, by a domain name extension, or by referenceto an internal table of such sites), DNS proxy 2610 determines whetherthe user has sufficient security privileges to access the site. If so,DNS proxy 2610 transmits a message to gatekeeper 2603 requesting that avirtual private network be created between user computer 2601 and securetarget site 2604. In one embodiment, gatekeeper 2603 creates “hopblocks”to be used by computer 2601 and secure target site 2604 for securecommunication. Then, gatekeeper 2603 communicates these to user computer2601. Thereafter, DNS proxy 2610 returns to user computer 2601 theresolved address passed to it by the gatekeeper (this address could bedifferent from the actual target computer) 2604, preferably using asecure administrative VPN. The address that is returned need not be theactual address of the destination computer.

Had the user requested lookup of a non-secure web site such as site2611, DNS proxy would merely pass through to conventional DNS server2609 the look-up request, which would be handled in a conventionalmanner, returning the IP address of non-secure web site 2611. If theuser had requested lookup of a secure web site but lacked credentials tocreate such a connection, DNS proxy 2610 would return a “host unknown”error to the user. In this manner, different users requesting access tothe same DNS name could be provided with different look-up results.

Gatekeeper 2603 can be implemented on a separate computer (as shown inFIG. 26) or as a function within modified DNS server 2602. In general,it is anticipated that gatekeeper 2703 facilitates the allocation andexchange of information needed to communicate securely, such as using“hopped” IP addresses. Secure hosts such as site 2604 are assumed to beequipped with a secure communication function such as an IP hoppingfunction 2608.

It will be appreciated that the functions of DNS proxy 2610 and DNSserver 2609 can be combined into a single server for convenience.Moreover, although element 2602 is shown as combining the functions oftwo servers, the two servers can be made to operate independently.

FIG. 27 shows steps that can be executed by DNS proxy server 2610 tohandle requests for DNS look-up for secure hosts. In step 2701, a DNSlook-up request is received for a target host. In step 2702, a check ismade to determine whether access to a secure host was requested. If not,then in step 2703 the DNS request is passed to conventional DNS server2609, which looks up the IP address of the target site and returns it tothe user's application for further processing.

In step 2702, if access to a secure host was requested, then in step2704 a further check is made to determine whether the user is authorizedto connect to the secure host. Such a check can be made with referenceto an internally stored list of authorized IP addresses, or can be madeby communicating with gatekeeper 2603 (e.g., over an “administrative”VPN that is secure). It will be appreciated that different levels ofsecurity can also be provided for different categories of hosts. Forexample, some sites may be designated as having a certain securitylevel, and the security level of the user requesting access must matchthat security level. The user's security level can also be determined bytransmitting a request message back to the user's computer requiringthat it prove that it has sufficient privileges.

If the user is not authorized to access the secure site, then a “hostunknown” message is returned (step 2705). If the user has sufficientsecurity privileges, then in step 2706 a secure VPN is establishedbetween the user's computer and the secure target site. As describedabove, this is preferably done by allocating a hopping regime that willbe carried out between the user's computer and the secure target site,and is preferably performed transparently to the user (i.e., the userneed not be involved in creating the secure link). As described invarious embodiments of this application, any of various fields can be“hopped” (e.g., IP source/destination addresses; a field in the header;etc.) in order to communicate securely.

Some or all of the security functions can be embedded in gatekeeper2603, such that it handles all requests to connect to secure sites. Inthis embodiment, DNS proxy 2610 communicates with gatekeeper 2603 todetermine (preferably over a secure administrative VPN) whether the userhas access to a particular web site. Various scenarios for implementingthese features are described by way of example below:

Scenario #1: Client has permission to access target computer, andgatekeeper has a rule to make a VPN for the client. In this scenario,the client's DNS request would be received by the DNS proxy server 2610,which would forward the request to gatekeeper 2603. The gatekeeper wouldestablish a VPN between the client and the requested target. Thegatekeeper would provide the address of the destination to the DNSproxy, which would then return the resolved name as a result. Theresolved address can be transmitted back to the client in a secureadministrative VPN.

Scenario #2: Client does not have permission to access target computer.In this scenario, the client's DNS request would be received by the DNSproxy server 2610, which would forward the request to gatekeeper 2603.The gatekeeper would reject the request, informing DNS proxy server 2610that it was unable to find the target computer. The DNS proxy 2610 wouldthen return a “host unknown” error message to the client.

Scenario #3: Client has permission to connect using a normal non-VPNlink, and the gatekeeper does not have a rule to set up a VPN for theclient to the target site. In this scenario, the client's DNS request isreceived by DNS proxy server 2610, which would check its rules anddetermine that no VPN is needed. Gatekeeper 2603 would then inform theDNS proxy server to forward the request to conventional DNS server 2609,which would resolve the request and return the result to the DNS proxyserver and then back to the client.

Scenario #4: Client does not have permission to establish anormal/non-VPN link, and the gatekeeper does not have a rule to make aVPN for the client to the target site. In this scenario, the DNS proxyserver would receive the client's DNS request and forward it togatekeeper 2603. Gatekeeper 2603 would determine that no special VPN wasneeded, but that the client is not authorized to communicate withnon-VPN members. The gatekeeper would reject the request, causing DNSproxy server 2610 to return an error message to the client.

C. Large Link to Small Link Bandwidth Management

One feature of the basic architecture is the ability to preventso-called “denial of service” attacks that can occur if a computerhacker floods a known Internet node with packets, thus preventing thenode from communicating with other nodes. Because IP addresses or otherfields are “hopped” and packets arriving with invalid addresses arequickly discarded, Internet nodes are protected against floodingtargeted at a single IP address.

In a system in which a computer is coupled through a link having alimited bandwidth (e.g., an edge router) to a node that can support amuch higher-bandwidth link (e.g., an Internet Service Provider), apotential weakness could be exploited by a determined hacker. Referringto FIG. 28, suppose that a first host computer 2801 is communicatingwith a second host computer 2804 using the IP address hopping principlesdescribed above. The first host computer is coupled through an edgerouter 2802 to an Internet Service Provider (ISP) 2803 through a lowbandwidth link (LOW BW), and is in turn coupled to second host computer2804 through parts of the Internet through a high bandwidth link (HIGHBW). In this architecture, the ISP is able to support a high bandwidthto the internet, but a much lower bandwidth to the edge router 2802.

Suppose that a computer hacker is able to transmit a large quantity ofdummy packets addressed to first host computer 2801 across highbandwidth link HIGH BW. Normally, host computer 2801 would be able toquickly reject the packets since they would not fall within theacceptance window permitted by the IP address hopping scheme. However,because the packets must travel across low bandwidth link LOW BW, thepackets overwhelm the lower bandwidth link before they are received byhost computer 2801. Consequently, the link to host computer 2801 iseffectively flooded before the packets can be discarded.

According to one inventive improvement, a “link guard” function 2805 isinserted into the high-bandwidth node (e.g., ISP 2803) that quicklydiscards packets destined for a low- bandwidth target node if they arenot valid packets. Each packet destined for a low-bandwidth node iscryptographically authenticated to determine whether it belongs to aVPN. If it is not a valid VPN packet, the packet is discarded at thehigh-bandwidth node. If the packet is authenticated as belonging to aVPN, the packet is passed with high preference. If the packet is a validnon-VPN packet, it is passed with a lower quality of service (e.g.,lower priority).

In one embodiment, the ISP distinguishes between VPN and non-VPN packetsusing the protocol of the packet. In the case of IPSEC [rfc 2401], thepackets have IP protocols 420 and 421. In the case of the TARP VPN, thepackets will have an IP protocol that is not yet defined. The ISP's linkguard, 2805, maintains a table of valid VPNs which it uses to validatewhether VPN packets are cryptographically valid. According to oneembodiment, packets that do not fall within any hop windows used bynodes on the low-bandwidth link are rejected, or are sent with a lowerquality of service. One approach for doing this is to provide a copy ofthe IP hopping tables used by the low-bandwidth nodes to thehigh-bandwidth node, such that both the high-bandwidth and low-bandwidthnodes track hopped packets (e.g., the high-bandwidth node moves itshopping window as valid packets are received). In such a scenario, thehigh-bandwidth node discards packets that do not fall within the hoppingwindow before they are transmitted over the low-bandwidth link. Thus,for example, ISP 2903 maintains a copy 2910 of the receive table used byhost computer 2901. Incoming packets that do not fall within thisreceive table are discarded. According to a different embodiment, linkguard 2805 validates each VPN packet using a keyed hashed messageauthentication code (HMAC) [rfc 2104].

According to another embodiment, separate VPNs (using, for example,hopblocks) can be established for communicating between thelow-bandwidth node and the high-bandwidth node (i.e., packets arrivingat the high-bandwidth node are converted into different packets beforebeing transmitted to the low-bandwidth node).

As shown in FIG. 29, for example, suppose that a first host computer2900 is communicating with a second host computer 2902 over theInternet, and the path includes a high bandwidth link HIGH BW to an ISP2901 and a low bandwidth link LOW BW through an edge router 2904. Inaccordance with the basic architecture described above, first hostcomputer 2900 and second host computer 2902 would exchange hopblocks (ora hopblock algorithm) and would be able to create matching transmit andreceive tables 2905, 2906, 2912 and 2913. Then in accordance with thebasic architecture, the two computers would transmit packets havingseemingly random IP source and destination addresses, and each wouldmove a corresponding hopping window in its receive table as validpackets were received.

Suppose that a nefarious computer hacker 2903 was able to deduce thatpackets having a certain range of IP addresses (e.g., addresses 100 to200 for the sake of simplicity) are being transmitted to ISP 2901, andthat these packets are being forwarded over a low-bandwidth link. Hackercomputer 2903 could thus “flood” packets having addresses falling intothe range 100 to 200, expecting that they would be forwarded along lowbandwidth link LOW BW, thus causing the low bandwidth link to becomeoverwhelmed. The fast packet reject mechanism in first host computer3000 would be of little use in rejecting these packets, since the lowbandwidth link was effectively jammed before the packets could berejected. In accordance with one aspect of the improvement, however, VPNlink guard 2911 would prevent the attack from impacting the performanceof VPN traffic because the packets would either be rejected as invalidVPN packets or given a lower quality of service than VPN traffic overthe lower bandwidth link. A denial-of- service flood attack could,however, still disrupt non-VPN traffic.

According to one embodiment of the improvement, ISP 2901 maintains aseparate VPN with first host computer 2900, and thus translates packetsarriving at the ISP into packets having a different IP header beforethey are transmitted to host computer 2900. The cryptographic keys usedto authenticate VPN packets at the link guard 2911 and the cryptographickeys used to encrypt and decrypt the VPN packets at host 2902 and host2901 can be different, so that link guard 2911 does not have access tothe private host data; it only has the capability to authenticate thosepackets.

According to yet a third embodiment, the low-bandwidth node can transmita special message to the high-bandwidth node instructing it to shut downall transmissions on a particular IP address, such that only hoppedpackets will pass through to the low-bandwidth node. This embodimentwould prevent a hacker from flooding packets using a single IP address.According to yet a fourth embodiment, the high-bandwidth node can beconfigured to discard packets transmitted to the low-bandwidth node ifthe transmission rate exceeds a certain predetermined threshold for anygiven IP address; this would allow hopped packets to go through. In thisrespect, link guard 2911 can be used to detect that the rate of packetson a given IP address are exceeding a threshold rate; further packetsaddressed to that same IP address would be dropped or transmitted at alower priority (e.g., delayed).

D. Traffic Limiter

In a system in which multiple nodes are communicating using “hopping”technology, a treasonous insider could internally flood the system withpackets. In order to prevent this possibility, one inventive improvementinvolves setting up “contracts” between nodes in the system, such that areceiver can impose a bandwidth limitation on each packet sender. Onetechnique for doing this is to delay acceptance of a checkpointsynchronization request from a sender until a certain time period (e.g.,one minute) has elapsed. Each receiver can effectively control the rateat which its hopping window moves by delaying “SYNC_ACK” responses to“SYNC_REQ” messages.

A simple modification to the checkpoint synchronizer will serve toprotect a receiver from accidental or deliberate overload from aninternally treasonous client. This modification is based on theobservation that a receiver will not update its tables until a SYNC_REQis received on hopped address CKPT_N. It is a simple matter of deferringthe generation of a new CKPT_N until an appropriate interval afterprevious checkpoints.

Suppose a receiver wished to restrict reception from a transmitter to100 packets a second, and that checkpoint synchronization messages weretriggered every 50 packets, A compliant transmitter would not issue newSYNC_REQ messages more often than every 0.5 seconds. The receiver coulddelay a non-compliant transmitter from synchronizing by delaying theissuance of CKPT_N for 0.5 second after the last SYNC_REQ was accepted.

In general, if M receivers need to restrict N transmitters issuing newSYNC_REQ messages after every W messages to sending R messages a secondin aggregate, each receiver could defer issuing a new CKPT_N untilMxNxW/R seconds have elapsed since the last SYNC_REQ has been receivedand accepted. If the transmitter exceeds this rate between a pair ofcheckpoints, it will issue the new checkpoint before the receiver isready to receive it, and the SYNC_REQ will be discarded by the receiver.After this, the transmitter will re-issue the SYNC_REQ every T1 secondsuntil it receives a SYNC_ACK. The receiver will eventually update CKPT_Nand the SYNC_REQ will be acknowledged. If the transmission rate greatlyexceeds the allowed rate, the transmitter will stop until it iscompliant. If the transmitter exceeds the allowed rate by a little, itwill eventually stop after several rounds of delayed synchronizationuntil it is in compliance. Hacking the transmitter's code to not shutoff only permits the transmitter to lose the acceptance window. In thiscase it can recover the window and proceed only after it is compliantagain.

Two practical issues should be considered when implementing the abovescheme:

-   -   1. The receiver rate should be slightly higher than the        permitted rate in order to allow for statistical fluctuations in        traffic arrival times and non-uniform load balancing.    -   2. Since a transmitter will rightfully continue to transmit for        a period after a SYNC_REQ is transmitted, the algorithm above        can artificially reduce the transmitter's bandwidth. If events        prevent a compliant transmitter from synchronizing for a period        (e.g. the network dropping a SYNC_REQ or a SYNC_ACK) a SYNC_REQ        will be accepted later than expected. After this, the        transmitter will transmit fewer than expected messages before        encountering the next checkpoint. The new checkpoint will not        have been activated and the transmitter will have to retransmit        the SYNC_REQ. This will appear to the receiver as if the        transmitter is not compliant. Therefore, the next checkpoint        will be accepted late from the transmitter's perspective. This        has the effect of reducing the transmitter's allowed packet rate        until the transmitter transmits at a packet rate below the        agreed upon rate for a period of time.

To guard against this, the receiver should keep track of the times thatthe last C SYNC_REQs were received and accepted and use the minimum ofMxNxW/R seconds after the last SYNC_REQ has been received and accepted,2xMxNxW/R seconds after next to the last SYNC_REQ has been received andaccepted, CxMxNxW/R seconds after (C-1)^(th) to the last SYNC_REQ hasbeen received, as the time to activate CKPT_N. This prevents thereceiver from inappropriately limiting the transmitter's packet rate ifat least one out of the last C SYNC_REQs was processed on the firstattempt.

FIG. 30 shows a system employing the above-described principles. In FIG.30, two computers 3000 and 3001 are assumed to be communicating over anetwork N in accordance with the “hopping” principles described above(e.g., hopped IP addresses, discriminator values, etc.). For the sake ofsimplicity, computer 3000 will be referred to as the receiving computerand computer 3001 will be referred to as the transmitting computer,although full duplex operation is of course contemplated. Moreover,although only a single transmitter is shown, multiple transmitters cantransmit to receiver 3000.

As described above, receiving computer 3000 maintains a receive table3002 including a window W that defines valid IP address pairs that willbe accepted when appearing in incoming data packets. Transmittingcomputer 3001 maintains a transmit table 3003 from which the next IPaddress pairs will be selected when transmitting a packet to receivingcomputer 3000. (For the sake of illustration, window W is alsoillustrated with reference to transmit table 3003). As transmittingcomputer moves through its table, it will eventually generate a SYNC_REQmessage as illustrated in function 3010. This is a request to receiver3000 to synchronize the receive table 3002, from which transmitter 3001expects a response in the form of a CKPT_N (included as part of aSYNC_ACK message). If transmitting computer 3001 transmits more messagesthan its allotment, it will prematurely generate the SYNC_REQ message.(If it has been altered to remove the SYNC_REQ message generationaltogether, it will fall out of synchronization since receiver 3000 willquickly reject packets that fall outside of window W, and the extrapackets generated by transmitter 3001 will be discarded).

In accordance with the improvements described above, receiving computer3000 performs certain steps when a SYNC_REQ message is received, asillustrated in FIG. 30. In step 3004, receiving computer 3000 receivesthe SYNC_REQ message. In step 3005, a check is made to determine whetherthe request is a duplicate. If so, it is discarded in step 3006. In step3007, a check is made to determine whether the SYNC_REQ received fromtransmitter 3001 was received at a rate that exceeds the allowable rateR (i.e., the period between the time of the last SYNC_REQ message). Thevalue R can be a constant, or it can be made to fluctuate as desired. Ifthe rate exceeds R, then in step 3008 the next activation of the nextCKPT_N hopping table entry is delayed by W/R seconds after the lastSYNC_REQ has been accepted.

Otherwise, if the rate has not been exceeded, then in step 3109 the nextCKPT_N value is calculated and inserted into the receiver's hoppingtable prior to the next SYNC_REQ from the transmitter 3101. Transmitter3101 then processes the SYNC_REQ in the normal manner.

E. Signaling Synchronizer

In a system in which a large number of users communicate with a centralnode using secure hopping technology, a large amount of memory must beset aside for hopping tables and their supporting data structures. Forexample, if one million subscribers to a web site occasionallycommunicate with the web site, the site must maintain one millionhopping tables, thus using up valuable computer resources, even thoughonly a small percentage of the users may actually be using the system atany one time. A desirable solution would be a system that permits acertain maximum number of simultaneous links to be maintained, but whichwould “recognize” millions of registered users at any one time. In otherwords, out of a population of a million registered users, a few thousandat a time could simultaneously communicate with a central server,without requiring that the server maintain one million hopping tables ofappreciable size.

One solution is to partition the central node into two nodes: asignaling server that performs session initiation for user log-on andlog-off (and requires only minimally sized tables), and a transportserver that contains larger hopping tables for the users. The signalingserver listens for the millions of known users and performs afast-packet reject of other (bogus) packets. When a packet is receivedfrom a known user, the signaling server activates a virtual private link(VPL) between the user and the transport server, where hopping tablesare allocated and maintained. When the user logs onto the signalingserver, the user's computer is provided with hop tables forcommunicating with the transport server, thus activating the VPL. TheVPLs can be torn down when they become inactive for a time period, orthey can be torn down upon user log-out. Communication with thesignaling server to allow user log-on and log-off can be accomplishedusing a specialized version of the checkpoint scheme described above.

FIG. 31 shows a system employing certain of the above-describedprinciples. In FIG. 31, a signaling server 3101 and a transport server3102 communicate over a link. Signaling server 3101 contains a largenumber of small tables 3106 and 3107 that contain enough information toauthenticate a communication request with one or more clients 3103 and3104. As described in more detail below, these small tables mayadvantageously be constructed as a special case of the synchronizingcheckpoint tables described previously. Transport server 3102, which ispreferably a separate computer in communication with signaling server3101, contains a smaller number of larger hopping tables 3108, 3109, and3110 that can be allocated to create a VPN with one of the clientcomputers.

According to one embodiment, a client that has previously registeredwith the system (e.g., via a system administration function, a userregistration procedure, or some other method) transmits a request forinformation from a computer (e.g., a web site). In one variation, therequest is made using a “hopped” packet, such that signaling server 3101will quickly reject invalid packets from unauthorized computers such ashacker computer 3105. An “administrative” VPN can be established betweenall of the clients and the signaling server in order to ensure that ahacker cannot flood signaling server 3101 with bogus packets. Details ofthis scheme are provided below.

Signaling server 3101 receives the request 3111 and uses it to determinethat client 3103 is a validly registered user. Next, signaling server3101 issues a request to transport server 3102 to allocate a hoppingtable (or hopping algorithm or other regime) for the purpose of creatinga VPN with client 3103. The allocated hopping parameters are returned tosignaling server 3101 (path 3113), which then supplies the hoppingparameters to client 3103 via path 3114, preferably in encrypted form.

Thereafter, client 3103 communicates with transport server 3102 usingthe normal hopping techniques described above. It will be appreciatedthat although signaling server 3101 and transport server 3102 areillustrated as being two separate computers, they could of course becombined into a single computer and their functions performed on thesingle computer. Alternatively, it is possible to partition thefunctions shown in FIG. 31 differently from as shown without departingfrom the inventive principles.

One advantage of the above-described architecture is that signalingserver 3101 need only maintain a small amount of information on a largenumber of potential users, yet it retains the capability of quicklyrejecting packets from unauthorized users such as hacker computer 3105.Larger data tables needed to perform the hopping and synchronizationfunctions are instead maintained in a transport server 3102, and asmaller number of these tables are needed since they are only allocatedfor “active” links. After a VPN has become inactive for a certain timeperiod (e.g., one hour), the VPN can be automatically torn down bytransport server 3102 or signaling server 3101.

A more detailed description will now be provided regarding how a specialcase of the checkpoint synchronization feature can be used to implementthe signaling scheme described above.

The signaling synchronizer may be required to support many (millions) ofstanding, low bandwidth connections. It therefore should minimizeper-VPL memory usage while providing the security offered by hoppingtechnology. In order to reduce memory usage in the signaling server, thedata hopping tables can be completely eliminated and data can be carriedas part of the SYNC_REQ message. The table used by the server side(receiver) and client side (transmitter) is shown schematically aselement 3106 in FIG. 31.

The meaning and behaviors of CKPT_N, CKPT_O and CKPT_R remain the samefrom the previous description, except that CKPT_N can receive a combineddata and SYNC_REQ message or a SYNC_REQ message without the data.

The protocol is a straightforward extension of the earlier synchronizer.Assume that a client transmitter is on and the tables are synchronized.The initial tables can be generated “out of band.” For example, a clientcan log into a web server to establish an account over the Internet. Theclient will receive keys etc encrypted over the Internet. Meanwhile, theserver will set up the signaling VPN on the signaling server.

Assuming that a client application wishes to send a packet to the serveron the client's standing signaling VPL:

-   -   1. The client sends the message marked as a data message on the        inner header using the transmitter's CKPT_N address. It turns        the transmitter off and starts a timer T1 noting CKPT_O.        Messages can be one of three types: DATA, SYNC_REQ and SYNC_ACK.        In the normal algorithm, some potential problems can be        prevented by identifying each message type as part of the        encrypted inner header field. In this algorithm, it is important        to distinguish a data packet and a SYNC_REQ in the signaling        synchronizer since the data and the SYNC_REQ come in on the same        address.    -   2. When the server receives a data message on its CKPT_N, it        verifies the message and passes it up the stack. The message can        be verified by checking message type and other information        (i.e., user credentials) contained in the inner header It        replaces its CKPT_O with CKPT_N and generates the next CKPT_N.        It updates its transmitter side CKPT_R to correspond to the        client's receiver side CKPT_R and transmits a SYNC ACK        containing CKPT_O in its payload.    -   3. When the client side receiver receives a SYNC_ACK on its        CKPT_R with a payload matching its transmitter side CKPT_O and        the transmitter is off, the transmitter is turned on and the        receiver side CKPT_R is updated. If the SYNC_ACK's payload does        not match the transmitter side CKPT_O or the transmitter is on,        the SYNC_ACK is simply discarded.    -   4. T1 expires: If the transmitter is off and the client's        transmitter side CKPT_O matches the CKPTO associated with the        timer, it starts timer T1 noting CKPT_O again, and a SYNC_REQ is        sent using the transmitter's CKPT_O address. Otherwise, no        action is taken.    -   5. When the server receives a SYNC_REQ on its CKPT_N, it        replaces its CKPT_O with CKPT_N and generates the next CKPT_N.        It updates its transmitter side CKPT_R to correspond to the        client's receiver side CKPT_R and transmits a SYNC_ACK        containing CKPT_O in its payload.    -   6. When the server receives a SYNC_REQ on its CKPT_O, it updates        its transmitter side CKPT_R to correspond to the client's        receiver side CKPT_R and transmits a SYNC_ACK containing CKPT_O        in its payload.

FIG. 32 shows message flows to highlight the protocol. Reading from topto bottom, the client sends data to the server using its transmitterside CKPT_N. The client side transmitter is turned off and a retry timeris turned off. The transmitter will not transmit messages as long as thetransmitter is turned off. The client side transmitter then loads CKPT_Ninto CKPT_O and updates CKPT_N. This message is successfully receivedand a passed up the stack. It also synchronizes the receiver i.e., theserver loads CKPT_N into CKPT_O and generates a new CKPT_N, it generatesa new CKPT_R in the server side transmitter and transmits a SYNC_ACKcontaining the server side receiver's CKPT_O the server. The SYNC_ACK issuccessfully received at the client. The client side receiver's CKPT_Ris updated, the transmitter is turned on and the retry timer is killed.The client side transmitter is ready to transmit a new data message.

Next, the client sends data to the server using its transmitter sideCKPT_N. The client side transmitter is turned off and a retry timer isturned off. The transmitter will not transmit messages as long as thetransmitter is turned off. The client side transmitter then loads CKPT_Ninto CKPT_O and updates CKPT_N. This message is lost. The client sidetimer expires and as a result a SYNC_REQ is transmitted on the clientside transmitter's CKPT_O (this will keep happening until the SYNC_ACKhas been received at the client). The SYNC_REQ is successfully receivedat the server. It synchronizes the receiver i.e., the server loadsCKPT_N into CKPT_O and generates a new CKPT_N, it generates an newCKPT_R in the server side transmitter and transmits a SYNC_ACKcontaining the server side receiver's CKPT_O the server. The SYNC_ACK issuccessfully received at the client. The client side receiver's CKPT_Ris updated, the transmitter is turned off and the retry timer is killed.The client side transmitter is ready to transmit a new data message.

There are numerous other scenarios that follow this flow. For example,the SYNC_ACK could be lost. The transmitter would continue to re-sendthe SYNC_REQ until the receiver synchronizes and responds.

The above-described procedures allow a client to be authenticated atsignaling server 3201 while maintaining the ability of signaling server3201 to quickly reject invalid packets, such as might be generated byhacker computer 3205. In various embodiments, the signaling synchronizeris really a derivative of the synchronizer. It provides the sameprotection as the hopping protocol, and it does so for a large number oflow bandwidth connections.

F. One-Click Secure On-line Communications and Secure Domain NameService

The present invention provides a technique for establishing a securecommunication link between a first computer and a second computer over acomputer network. Preferably, a user enables a secure communication linkusing a single click of a mouse, or a corresponding minimal input fromanother input device, such as a keystroke entered on a keyboard or aclick entered through a trackball. Alternatively, the secure link isautomatically established as a default setting at boot-up of thecomputer (i.e., no click). FIG. 33 shows a system block diagram 3300 ofa computer network in which the one-click secure communication method ofthe present invention is suitable. In FIG. 33, a computer terminal orclient computer 3301, such as a personal computer (PC), is connected toa computer network 3302, such as the Internet, through an ISP 3303.Alternatively, computer 3301 can be connected to computer network 3302through an edge router. Computer 3301 includes an input device, such asa keyboard and/or mouse, and a display device, such as a monitor.Computer 3301 can communicate conventionally with another computer 3304connected to computer network 3302 over a communication link 3305 usinga browser 3306 that is installed and operates on computer 3301 in awell-known manner.

Computer 3304 can be, for example, a server computer that is used forconducting e-commerce. In the situation when computer network 3302 isthe Internet, computer 3304 typically will have a standard top-leveldomain name such as .com, .net, .org, .edu, .mil or .gov.

FIG. 34 shows a flow diagram 3400 for installing and establishing a“one-click” secure communication link over a computer network accordingto the present invention. At step 3401, computer 3301 is connected toserver computer 3304 over a non-VPN communication link 3305. Web browser3306 displays a web page associated with server 3304 in a well-knownmanner. According to one variation of the invention, the display ofcomputer 3301 contains a hyperlink, or an icon representing a hyperlink,for selecting a virtual private network (VPN) communication link (“gosecure” hyperlink) through computer network 3302 between terminal 3301and server 3304. Preferably, the “go secure” hyperlink is displayed aspart of the web page downloaded from server computer 3304, therebyindicating that the entity providing server 3304 also provides VPNcapability.

By displaying the “go secure” hyperlink, a user at computer 3301 isinformed that the current communication link between computer 3301 andserver computer 3304 is a non-secure, non-VPN communication link. Atstep 3402, it is determined whether a user of computer 3301 has selectedthe “go secure” hyperlink. If not, processing resumes using a non-secure(conventional) communication method (not shown). If, at step 3402, it isdetermined that the user has selected the “go secure” hyperlink, flowcontinues to step 3403 where an object associated with the hyperlinkdetermines whether a VPN communication software module has already beeninstalled on computer 3301. Alternatively, a user can enter a commandinto computer 3301 to “go secure.”

If, at step 3403, the object determines that the software module hasbeen installed, flow continues to step 3407. If, at step 3403, theobject determines that the software module has not been installed, flowcontinues to step 3404 where a non-VPN communication link 3307 islaunched between computer 3301 and a website 3308 over computer network3302 in a well- known manner. Website 3308 is accessible by all computerterminals connected to computer network 3302 through a non-VPNcommunication link. Once connected to website 3308, a software modulefor establishing a secure communication link over computer network 3302can be downloaded and installed. Flow continues to step 3405 where,after computer 3301 connects to website 3308, the software module forestablishing a communication link is downloaded and installed in awell-known manner on computer terminal 3301 as software module 3309. Atstep 3405, a user can optionally select parameters for the softwaremodule, such as enabling a secure communication link mode ofcommunication for all communication links over computer network 3302. Atstep 3406, the communication link between computer 3301 and website 3308is then terminated in a well-known manner.

By clicking on the “go secure” hyperlink, a user at computer 3301 hasenabled a secure communication mode of communication between computer3301 and server computer 3304. According to one variation of theinvention, the user is not required to do anything more than merelyclick the “go secure” hyperlink. The user does not need to enter anyuser identification information, passwords or encryption keys forestablishing a secure communication link. All procedures required forestablishing a secure communication link between computer 3301 andserver computer 3304 are performed transparently to a user at computer3301.

At step 3407, a secure VPN communications mode of operation has beenenabled and software module 3309 begins to establish a VPN communicationlink. In one embodiment, software module 3309 automatically replaces thetop-level domain name for server 3304 within browser 3406 with a securetop-level domain name for server computer 3304. For example, if thetop-level domain name for server 3304 is .com, software module 3309replaces the .com top-level domain name with a .scom top-level domainname, where the “s” stands for secure. Alternatively, software module3409 can replace the top-level domain name of server 3304 with any othernon-standard top-level domain name.

Because the secure top-level domain name is a non-standard domain name,a query to a standard domain name service (DNS) will return a messageindicating that the universal resource locator (URL) is unknown.According to the invention, software module 3409 contains the URL forquerying a secure domain name service (SDNS) for obtaining the URL for asecure top-level domain name. In this regard, software module 3309accesses a secure portal 3310 that interfaces a secure network 3311 tocomputer network 3302. Secure network 3311 includes an internal router3312, a secure domain name service (SDNS) 3313, a VPN gatekeeper 3314and a secure proxy 3315. The secure network can include other networkservices, such as e-mail 3316, a plurality of chatrooms (of which onlyone chatroom 3317 is shown), and a standard domain name service (STDDNS) 3318. Of course, secure network 3311 can include other resourcesand services that are not shown in FIG. 33.

When software module 3309 replaces the standard top-level domain namefor server 3304 with the secure top-level domain name, software module3309 sends a query to SDNS 3313 at step 3408 through secure portal 3310preferably using an administrative VPN communication link 3319. In thisconfiguration, secure portal 3310 can only be accessed using a VPNcommunication link. Preferably, such a VPN communication link can bebased on a technique of inserting a source and destination IP addresspair into each data packet that is selected according to a pseudo-randomsequence; an IP address hopping regime that pseudorandomly changes IPaddresses in packets transmitted between a client computer and a securetarget computer; periodically changing at least one field in a series ofdata packets according to a known sequence; an Internet Protocol (IP)address in a header of each data packet that is compared to a table ofvalid IP addresses maintained in a table in the second computer; and/ora comparison of the IP address in the header of each data packet to amoving window of valid IP addresses, and rejecting data packets havingIP addresses that do not fall within the moving window. Other types ofVPNs can alternatively be used. Secure portal 3310 authenticates thequery from software module 3309 based on the particular informationhopping technique used for VPN communication link 3319.

SDNS 3313 contains a cross-reference database of secure domain names andcorresponding secure network addresses. That is, for each secure domainname, SDNS 3313 stores a computer network address corresponding to thesecure domain name. An entity can register a secure domain name in SDNS3313 so that a user who desires a secure communication link to thewebsite of the entity can automatically obtain the secure computernetwork address for the secure website. Moreover, an entity can registerseveral secure domain names, with each respective secure domain namerepresenting a different priority level of access in a hierarchy ofaccess levels to a secure website. For example, a securities tradingwebsite can provide users secure access so that a denial of serviceattack on the website will be ineffectual with respect to userssubscribing to the secure website service. Different levels ofsubscription can be arranged based on, for example, an escalating fee,so that a user can select a desired level of guarantee for connecting tothe secure securities trading website. When a user queries SDNS 3313 forthe secure computer network address for the securities trading website,SDNS 3313 determines the particular secure computer network addressbased on the user's identity and the user's subscription level.

At step 3409, SDNS 3313 accesses VPN gatekeeper 3314 for establishing aVPN communication link between software module 3309 and secure server3320. Server 3320 can only be accessed through a VPN communication link.VPN gatekeeper 3314 provisions computer 3301 and secure web servercomputer 3320, or a secure edge router for server computer 3320, therebycreating the VPN. Secure server computer 3320 can be a separate servercomputer from server computer 3304, or can be the same server computerhaving both non-VPN and VPN communication link capability, such as shownby server computer 3322. Returning to FIG. 34, in step 3410, SDNS 3313returns a secure URL to software module 3309 for the .scom serveraddress for a secure server 3320 corresponding to server 3304.

Alternatively, SDNS 3313 can be accessed through secure portal 3310 “inthe clear”, that is, without using an administrative VPN communicationlink. In this situation, secure portal 3310 preferably authenticates thequery using any well-known technique, such as a cryptographic technique,before allowing the query to proceed to SDNS 3319. Because the initialcommunication link in this situation is not a VPN communication link,the reply to the query can be “in the clear.” The querying computer canuse the clear reply for establishing a VPN link to the desired domainname. Alternatively, the query to SDNS 3313 can be in the clear, andSDNS 3313 and gatekeeper 3314 can operate to establish a VPNcommunication link to the querying computer for sending the reply.

At step 3411, software module 3309 accesses secure server 3320 throughVPN communication link 3321 based on the VPN resources allocated by VPNgatekeeper 3314. At step 3412, web browser 3306 displays a secure iconindicating that the current communication link to server 3320 is asecure VPN communication link. Further communication between computers3301 and 3320 occurs via the VPN, e.g., using a “hopping” regime asdiscussed above. When VPN link 3321 is terminated at step 3413, flowcontinues to step 3414 where software module 3309 automatically replacesthe secure top-level domain name with the corresponding non-securetop-level domain name for server 3304. Browser 3306 accesses a standardDNS 3325 for obtaining the non-secure URL for server 3304. Browser 3306then connects to server 3304 in a well-known manner. At step 3415,browser 3306 displays the “go secure” hyperlink or icon for selecting aVPN communication link between terminal 3301 and server 3304. By againdisplaying the “go secure” hyperlink, a user is informed that thecurrent communication link is a non-secure, non-VPN communication link.

When software module 3309 is being installed or when the user isoff-line, the user can optionally specify that all communication linksestablished over computer network 3302 are secure communication links.Thus, anytime that a communication link is established, the link is aVPN link. Consequently, software module 3309 transparently accesses SDNS3313 for obtaining the URL for a selected secure website. In otherwords, in one embodiment, the user need not “click” on the secure optioneach time secure communication is to be effected.

Additionally, a user at computer 3301 can optionally select a securecommunication link through proxy computer 3315. Accordingly, computer3301 can establish a VPN communication link 3323 with secure servercomputer 3320 through proxy computer 3315. Alternatively, computer 3301can establish a non-VPN communication link 3324 to a non-secure website,such as non-secure server computer 3304.

FIG. 35 shows a flow diagram 3500 for registering a secure domain nameaccording to the present invention. At step 3501, a requester accesseswebsite 3308 and logs into a secure domain name registry service that isavailable through website 3308. At step 3502, the requestor completes anonline registration form for registering a secure domain name having atop-level domain name, such as .com, .net, .org, .edu, .mil or .gov. Ofcourse, other secure top-level domain names can also be used.Preferably, the requestor must have previously registered a non- securedomain name corresponding to the equivalent secure domain name that isbeing requested. For example, a requester attempting to register securedomain name “website.scom” must have previously registered thecorresponding non-secure domain name “website.com”.

At step 3503, the secure domain name registry service at website 3308queries a non- secure domain name server database, such as standard DNS3322, using, for example, a whois query, for determining ownershipinformation relating to the non-secure domain name corresponding to therequested secure domain name. At step 3504, the secure domain nameregistry service at website 3308 receives a reply from standard DNS 3322and at step 3505 determines whether there is conflicting ownershipinformation for the corresponding non-secure domain name. If there is noconflicting ownership information, flow continues to step 3507,otherwise flow continues to step 3506 where the requestor is informed ofthe conflicting ownership information. Flow returns to step 3502.

When there is no conflicting ownership information at step 3505, thesecure domain name registry service (website 3308) informs the requestorthat there is no conflicting ownership information and prompts therequestor to verify the information entered into the online form andselect an approved form of payment. After confirmation of the enteredinformation and appropriate payment information, flow continues to step3508 where the newly registered secure domain name sent to SDNS 3313over communication link 3326.

If, at step 3505, the requested secure domain name does not have acorresponding equivalent non-secure domain name, the present inventioninforms the requestor of the situation and prompts the requestor foracquiring the corresponding equivalent non-secure domain name for anincreased fee. By accepting the offer, the present inventionautomatically registers the corresponding equivalent non-secure domainname with standard DNS 3325 in a well-known manner. Flow then continuesto step 3508.

G. Tunneling Secure Address Hopping Protocol Through Existing ProtocolUsing Web Proxy

The present invention also provides a technique for implementing thefield hopping schemes described above in an application program on theclient side of a firewall between two computer networks, and in thenetwork stack on the server side of the firewall. The present inventionuses a new secure connectionless protocol that provides good denial ofservice rejection capabilities by layering the new protocol on top of anexisting IP protocol, such as the ICMP, UDP or TCP protocols. Thus, thisaspect of the present invention does not require changes in the Internetinfrastructure.

According to the invention, communications are protected by aclient-side proxy application program that accepts unencrypted,unprotected communication packets from a local browser application. Theclient-side proxy application program tunnels the unencrypted,unprotected communication packets through a new protocol, therebyprotecting the communications from a denial of service at the serverside. Of course, the unencrypted, unprotected communication packets canbe encrypted prior to tunneling.

The client-side proxy application program is not an operating systemextension and does not involve any modifications to the operating systemnetwork stack and drivers. Consequently, the client is easier toinstall, remove and support in comparison to a VPN. Moreover, theclient- side proxy application can be allowed through a corporatefirewall using a much smaller “hole” in the firewall and is less of asecurity risk in comparison to allowing a protocol layer VPN through acorporate firewall.

The server-side implementation of the present invention authenticatesvalid field-hopped packets as valid or invalid very early in the serverpacket processing, similar to a standard virtual private network, forgreatly minimizing the impact of a denial of service attempt incomparison to normal TCP/IP and HTTP communications, thereby protectingthe server from invalid communications.

FIG. 36 shows a system block diagram of a computer network 3600 in whicha virtual private connection according to the present invention can beconfigured to more easily traverse a firewall between two computernetworks. FIG. 37 shows a flow diagram 3700 for establishing a virtualprivate connection that is encapsulated using an existing networkprotocol.

In FIG. 36 a local area network (LAN) 3601 is connected to anothercomputer network 3602, such as the Internet, through a firewallarrangement 3603. Firewall arrangement operates in a well-known mannerto interface LAN 3601 to computer network 3602 and to protect LAN 3601from attacks initiated outside of LAN 3601.

A client computer 3604 is connected to LAN 3601 in a well-known manner.Client computer 3604 includes an operating system 3605 and a web browser3606. Operating system 3605 provides kernel mode functions for operatingclient computer 3604. Browser 3606 is an application program foraccessing computer network resources connected to LAN 3601 and computernetwork 3602 in a well-known manner. According to the present invention,a proxy application 3607 is also stored on client computer 3604 andoperates at an application layer in conjunction with browser 3606. Proxyapplication 3607 operates at the application layer within clientcomputer 3604 and when enabled, modifies unprotected, unencryptedmessage packets generated by browser 3606 by inserting data into themessage packets that are used for forming a virtual private connectionbetween client computer 3604 and a server computer connected to LAN 3601or computer network 3602. According to the invention, a virtual privateconnection does not provide the same level of security to the clientcomputer as a virtual private network. A virtual private connection canbe conveniently authenticated so that, for example, a denial of serviceattack can be rapidly rejected, thereby providing different levels ofservice that can be subscribed to by a user.

Proxy application 3607 is conveniently installed and uninstalled by auser because proxy application 3607 operates at the application layerwithin client computer 3604. On installation, proxy application 3607preferably configures browser 3606 to use proxy application for all webcommunications. That is, the payload portion of all message packets ismodified with the data for forming a virtual private connection betweenclient computer 3604 and a server computer. Preferably, the data forforming the virtual private connection contains field-hopping data, suchas described above in connection with VPNs. Also, the modified messagepackets preferably conform to the UDP protocol. Alternatively, themodified message packets can conform to the TCP/IP protocol or the ICMPprotocol. Alternatively, proxy application 3606 can be selected andenabled through, for example, an option provided by browser 3606.Additionally, proxy application 3607 can be enabled so that only thepayload portion of specially designated message packets is modified withthe data for forming a virtual private connection between clientcomputer 3604 and a designated host computer. Specially designatedmessage packets can be, for example, selected predetermined domainnames.

Referring to FIG. 37, at step 3701, unprotected and unencrypted messagepackets are generated by browser 3606. At step 3702, proxy application3607 modifies the payload portion of all message packets by tunnelingthe data for forming a virtual private connection between clientcomputer 3604 and a destination server computer into the payloadportion. At step, 3703, the modified message packets are sent fromclient computer 3604 to, for example, website (server computer) 3608over computer network 3602.

Website 3608 includes a VPN guard portion 3609, a server proxy portion3610 and a web server portion 3611. VPN guard portion 3609 is embeddedwithin the kernel layer of the operating system of website 3608 so thatlarge bandwidth attacks on website 3608 are rapidly rejected. Whenclient computer 3604 initiates an authenticated connection to website3608, VPN guard portion 3609 is keyed with the hopping sequencecontained in the message packets from client computer 3604, therebyperforming a strong authentication of the client packet streams enteringwebsite 3608 at step 3704. VPN guard portion 3609 can be configured forproviding different levels of authentication and, hence, quality ofservice, depending upon a subscribed level of service. That is, VPNguard portion 3609 can be configured to let all message packets throughuntil a denial of service attack is detected, in which case VPN guardportion 3609 would allow only client packet streams conforming to akeyed hopping sequence, such as that of the present invention.

Server proxy portion 3610 also operates at the kernel layer withinwebsite 3608 and catches incoming message packets from client computer3604 at the VPN level. At step 3705, server proxy portion 3610authenticates the message packets at the kernel level within hostcomputer 3604 using the destination IP address, UDP ports anddiscriminator fields. The authenticated message packets are thenforwarded to the authenticated message packets to web server portion3611 as normal TCP web transactions.

At step 3705, web server portion 3611 responds to message packetsreceived from client computer 3604 in accordance with the particularnature of the message packets by generating reply message packets. Forexample, when a client computer requests a webpage, web server portion3611 generates message packets corresponding to the requested webpage.At step 3706, the reply message packets pass through server proxyportion 3610, which inserts data into the payload portion of the messagepackets that are used for forming the virtual private connection betweenhost computer 3608 and client computer 3604 over computer network 3602.Preferably, the data for forming the virtual private connection iscontains field-hopping data, such as described above in connection withVPNs. Server proxy portion 3610 operates at the kernel layer within hostcomputer 3608 to insert the virtual private connection data into thepayload portion of the reply message packets. Preferably, the modifiedmessage packets sent by host computer 3608 to client computer 3604conform to the UDP protocol. Alternatively, the modified message packetscan conform to the TCP/IP protocol or the ICMP protocol.

At step 3707, the modified packets are sent from host computer 3608 overcomputer network 3602 and pass through firewall 3603. Once throughfirewall 3603, the modified packets are directed to client computer 3604over LAN 3601 and are received at step 3708 by proxy application 3607 atthe application layer within client computer 3604. Proxy application3607 operates to rapidly evaluate the modified message packets fordetermining whether the received packets should be accepted or dropped.If the virtual private connection data inserted into the receivedinformation packets conforms to expected virtual private connectiondata, then the received packets are accepted. Otherwise, the receivedpackets are dropped.

While the present invention has been described in connection with theillustrated embodiments, it will be appreciated and understood thatmodifications may be made without departing from the true spirit andscope of the invention.

1-30. (canceled)
 31. A method for establishing an encryptedcommunication link between a first device and a second device over anelectronic network, the method comprising: enabling, at the firstdevice, a secure communication mode without a user entering anycryptographic information for establishing the secure communicationmode; and establishing, based on a determination that the securecommunication mode has been enabled, the encrypted communication linkbetween the first device and the second device over the electronicnetwork, the establishing including: receiving an identifier associatedwith the second device; constructing a domain name based on theidentifier; and initiating establishment of the encrypted communicationlink between the first device and the second device over the electronicnetwork using the domain name.
 32. The method of claim 31, whereinenabling the secure communication mode includes receiving a commandentered into the first device by the user, and the command specifies thesecure communication mode.
 33. The method of claim 32, wherein thecommand defines a setup parameter associated with the securecommunication mode.
 34. The method of claim 32, wherein receiving thecommand includes: displaying, at the first device, a user interfaceincluding a user interface element for enabling the secure communicationmode; and receiving the command from the user via the user interfaceelement.
 35. The method of claim 34, wherein the user interfacecomprises an application stored on the first device.
 36. The method ofclaim 35, wherein the application comprises a web browser.
 37. Themethod of claim 31, wherein initiating establishment of the encryptedcommunication link includes sending, to a secure domain name service(SDNS), a query for a network address associated with the domain name.38. The method of claim 37, further comprising receiving, from the SDNSin response to the query, the network address associated with the domainname.
 39. The method of claim 37, further comprising, receiving, inresponse to the query, a list of network addresses associated with thedomain name.
 40. The method of claim 39, wherein the list of networkaddresses includes a plurality of pseudorandom network addresses. 41.The method of claim 39, further comprising communicating with the seconddevice over the encrypted communication link, the communicatingcomprising: transmitting, by the first device, packets to the seconddevice; for each transmitted packet: selecting a network address fromthe list of network addresses; and inserting the selected networkaddress into the transmitted packet; and receiving, by the first device,packets from the second device over the electronic network; and for eachreceived packet: comparing a network address in the received packet tothe list of network addresses; rejecting the received packet if itcontains a network address that is not in the list of network addresses;and accepting the received packet if it contains a network address thatis in the list of network addresses.
 42. The method of claim 31,wherein: the identifier includes a non-secure domain name; andconstructing the domain name includes replacing the non-secure domainname with a secure domain name.
 43. The method of claim 31, furthercomprising: determining, by the first device in response to enabling thesecure communication mode, whether a secure communication softwaremodule should be downloaded and stored on the first device; accessing,based on a determination that the secure communication software moduleshould be downloaded and stored on the first device, a network addressfor loading the secure communication software module; and storing thesecure communication software module at the first device.
 44. The methodof claim 31, wherein the encrypted communication link comprises avirtual private network communication link over the electronic network.45. The method of claim 31, further comprising displaying a visibleindication on a display of the first device that the encryptedcommunication link is established.
 46. A first device configured tocommunicate with a second device over an electronic network, the firstdevice comprising: a communications component that communicates over theelectronic network; a memory storing computer program instructions; andat least one processor that executes the instructions to: enable asecure communication mode without a user entering any cryptographicinformation for establishing the secure communication mode; andestablish, based on a determination that the secure communication modehas been enabled, the encrypted communication link between the firstdevice and the second device over the electronic network, theestablishing including: receiving an identifier associated with thesecond device; constructing a domain name based on the identifier; andinitiating establishment of the encrypted communication link between thefirst device and the second device over the electronic network via thecommunications device using the domain name.
 47. The first device ofclaim 46, further comprising: a display device; wherein the at least oneprocessor further executes the instructions to: display, on the displaydevice, a user interface including a user interface element for enablingthe secure communication mode; receive a command from the user via theuser interface element; and enable the secure communication mode inresponse to receiving the command.
 48. The first device of claim 47,wherein the command defines a setup parameter associated with the securecommunication mode.
 49. The first device of claim 47, wherein the userinterface comprises an application stored in the memory device.
 50. Thefirst device of claim 49, wherein the application comprises a webbrowser.
 51. The first device of claim 46, wherein the at least oneprocessor further executes the instructions to initiate establishment ofthe encrypted communication link by sending, to a secure domain nameservice (SDNS), a query for a network address associated with the domainname.
 52. The first device of claim 51, wherein the at least oneprocessor further executes the instructions to receive, from the SDNS inresponse to the query, the network address associated with the domainname.
 53. The first device of claim 51, wherein the at least oneprocessor further executes the instructions to receive, in response tothe query, a list of network addresses associated with the domain name.54. The first device of claim 53, wherein the list of network addressesincludes a plurality of pseudorandom network addresses.
 55. The firstdevice of claim 54, wherein the at least one processor further executesthe instructions to communicate with the second device over theencrypted communication link, including to: transmit, via thecommunications device, packets to the second device over the electronicnetwork; for each transmitted packet: select a network address from thelist of network addresses; insert the selected network address into thetransmitted packet; receive, via the communications device, packets fromthe second device over the electronic network; and for each receivedpacket: compare a network address in the received packet to the list ofnetwork addresses; reject the received packet if it contains a networkaddress that is not in the list of network addresses; and accept thereceived packet if it contains a network address that is in the list ofnetwork addresses.
 56. The first device of claim 46, wherein: theidentifier includes a non-secure domain name; and the at least oneprocessor further executes the instructions to construct the domain nameby replacing the non-secure domain name with a secure domain name. 57.The first device of claim 46, wherein the at least one processor isfurther configured to execute the instructions to: determine, inresponse to enabling the secure communication mode, whether a securecommunication software module should be downloaded and stored on thefirst device; access, via the communications device based on adetermination that the secure communication software module should bedownloaded and stored on the first device, a network address for loadingthe secure communication software module; and store the securecommunication software module in the memory device.
 58. The first deviceof claim 46, wherein the encrypted communication link comprises avirtual private network communication link over the electronic network.59. The first device of claim 46, wherein the encrypted communicationlink is one encrypted communication link in a hierarchy of a pluralityof encrypted communication links established on the electronic network.60. The first device of claim 46, further comprising: a display device;wherein the at least one processor further executes the instructions todisplay, on the display device, a visible indication that the encryptedcommunication link is established.